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NEW PERSPECTIVES TO THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
SYSTEM 
RULE-ORIENTEDNESS AND NEGOTIATION-ORIENTEDNESS 
 
By 
Andrey Kovsh 
 
Increasing international economic interdependence has obviously become a 
benefit as well as challenge to nation-states across the world. The pursuit of free trade 
has been reinforced by such movement, critically enhancing the need to establish an 
institution regulating the affairs of international trade. Amidst these developments of 
the international economy, the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a global arbiter 
of international trade has received renewed focus as its rulings have become 
automatically binding on its member countries since its inception in 1995. Among 
controversial issues that have emerged was the critical question of how the dispute 
settlement mechanism should operate. This paper will seek to analyze the dispute 
settlement mechanism with an emphasis on the fundamental approach that should be 
taken in resolving disagreements. 
 iv 
This thesis will survey how the current dispute settlement system works and 
will broadly identify its procedures as either "rule-oriented" or "negotiation-oriented". 
The rule-oriented approach refers to a system in which disputes are resolved through 
adjudication or litigation process of applying previously set rules. The 
negotiation-oriented approach is a mechanism that concentrates on negotiation 
processes for reaching a mutually agreeable resolution to trade disputes. After 
concluding that the current dispute settlement procedure incorporates aspects of both 
of these two approaches, this paper will analyze the underlying rationales and 
perspectives of two approaches. Also, this paper will seek to examine the efficiency 
of each approach through an in-depth review of the cases resolved through either kind 
of methods. Through these analyses this paper mainly argues that the 
rule-orientedness approach of the WTO dispute settlement system should continue to 
complement itself with the negotiation-orientedness in order to achieve its 
fundamental goal of reaching mutually agreed resolutions and enforcement. The 
paper concludes with a brief look at the future of the newly emerging idea of 
"principle-orientedness". 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background Information 
With the inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO), as the successor to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the dispute settlement system 
became a legalistic mechanism by acquiring binding force on its Member countries.1 
The WTO, consequently, became an important international organization with a 
great amount of influence in international trade affairs. The issues dealt at the 
WTO expanded into areas such as the intellectual property, investment, the 
environment, and genetically modified organisms, and more. Fearful of the 
immense amount of influence exerted by the WTO, some argue that such issues 
should be managed by other specialized organizations than the WTO.2 Amidst such 
controversy, it is still irrefutable that the WTO has grown to become a major 
international organization extensively affecting the world trade. 
For the WTO, with its heightened importance and as the center of trade 
disputes, one of the most important matters of concern became how the WTO as a 
system for settling disputes functioned. A significant deal of debate as to whether 
the dispute settlement should operate in a diplomatic way or legalistic way existed 
                                                          
1
 John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, and Alan O. Sykes, Jr. Legal Problems of 
International Economic Relations Cases, Materials and Text Third Edition (St. Paul, Minn.: 
West Publishing, 1995), 280-290. 
2
 Markus Krajewski "Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO 
Law," Journal of World Trade 35(1) (2001): 167-186. 
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since the beginning of GATT. Although the WTO dispute settlement system is a 
mechanism of elaborately laid out rules, it embraces both legal and diplomatic 
means to resolving disputes through procedures such as panel proceedings, the 
Appellate Body Reviews, consultations, good offices, conciliation, and 
mediation. 
Whatever the means, however, the WTO dispute settlement system should 
work towards achieving its fundamental goal. The fundamental goal of the WTO, 
here, can be defined as obtaining mutually agreed resolution and, consequently, its 
enforcement. Therefore, the dispute settlement should be structured and functioned 
in a way to most appropriately reach a mutually agreed resolution and to enforce its 
rulings. For such purposes, this paper looks into the approaches that work toward 
achieving the WTO's goals. 
 
1.2 Main Argument 
The two main approaches to the dispute settlement are termed as 
"rule-oriented" approach and "negotiation-oriented" approach. The first 
"rule-oriented" approach refers to settling disputes by applying the relevant laws that 
were previously agreed upon by members. The second "negotiation-oriented" 
approach, on the other hand, refers to settling disputes without such rules but by 
resorting to negotiation and diplomacy between the parties involved. While the 
WTO has gained a significant amount of legalistic aspects, the diplomatic methods 
are still embedded in the WTO dispute settlement processes. 
The main argument of this paper is that in order to achieve its principal 
 3 
goals of deriving mutually agreed resolution and obtaining enforcement of the 
rulings, the WTO dispute settlement should utilize the "negotiation-oriented" methods 
in conjunction with the currently dominant "rule-oriented" procedures. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Paper 
In Chapter II, this paper first examines major features of the WTO dispute 
settlement procedure and identifies and categorizes each procedure as either legalistic 
(rule-oriented) or diplomatic (negotiation-oriented) methods. After explaining 
research methodologies which are divided into two sections of normative and 
empirical sections in Chapter III, the paper begins extensive analyses of the two 
approaches in Chapter IV. In the first section, a normative analysis of both 
approaches is performed by studying and comparing the pros and cons of the two 
approaches. In the second section of Chapter IV, an empirical analysis is 
performed with comparison of numbers of cases that were resolved through either 
the legalistic or diplomatic approaches. 
Through such studies, this paper concludes by emphasizing that the 
legalistic nature of the current dispute settlement system should be 
complemented with diplomatic characteristics. In Chapter V, it also briefly 
touches upon the future prospects of the WTO with new shifts such as 
"principle-oriented" approach and concludes in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate the two main perspectives of 
what could be considered the basis of the current WTO dispute settlement procedure. 
After the review of the dispute settlement procedures, it will begin the discussion of 
two broad perspectives, i.e. diplomatic and legalistic approaches. The focus will be 
placed on the arguments made for and against each approaches and analyses on them. 
After such assessment, it will consider some of specific arguments pertaining to the 
two main approaches. 
Followed by the normative assessment of dominant arguments, this paper 
will seek to look into the practicality of each approach by comparing numbers of 
cases settled by either diplomatic means or legal methods of the WTO dispute 
settlement system. It will also compare the number of cases resolved at the panel 
stage vis-à-vis the number of cases appealed and brought to the Appellate Review and 
consider the compliance of the panel reports of member countries. 
Through these two kinds of analyses, this paper aims to explore the question 
whether legalistic or diplomatic means are sufficiently used at the WTO dispute 
settlement process and what aspects have to be supplemented in order to achieve the 
goal of the WTO dispute settlement process. 
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CHAPTER III 
OVERVIEW OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
 
3.1 Why the Dispute Settlement important? 
A myriad of international trade agreements at bilateral, regional and 
multilateral levels have been signed to address the ever-increasing international 
economic transactions and establish norms and rules in international trade arena. 
But there is not a perfect contract in the world: none of the international trade 
agreements can foresee and create provisions for all the possible disputes in their 
negotiation stage. Especially in trading negotiations involving a number of 
countries with different stakes, when a deal is badly needed for political reasons, but 
substantive agreement cannot be reached, negotiators sometimes opt for a vague 
arrangement which permits conflicting interpretations.3 Given such an incomplete 
coverage of future contingencies by an international trade agreement, the DSM 
should be viewed as a mechanism by which incomplete provisions of the 
agreement are completed. In addition to the problem of incompleteness, a DSM 
of an international agreement may effectively cope with other transaction cost such as 
moral hazard and opportunism.4 
Many scholars with economic approach emphasize the importance of DSM 
in facilitating trade liberalization in member countries to an agreement by helping 
                                                          
3
 Hoekman, Bernard M. and Michel M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World 
Trading System: From GATT to WTO. Oxford University Press, 1995 
4
 Dixit, Avinash K., The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics 
Perspective. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996 
 6 
sustain international cooperation and codifying trigger strategies which support the 
most cooperative tariff level.5 DSM helps eliminate the coordination problems that 
could otherwise plague countries in their attempts to choose among the multiplicity of 
cooperative tariffs. Bagwell and Staiger portray DSM as a permanent ion to the 
punishment phase, which supports the most cooperative tariff level.6 Kovenock and 
Thursby combine both cooperative and non-cooperative approaches in analyzing 
international trade agreements: an explicit agreement may be violated at some finite, 
but positive, cost. The cost arises from what they call "international obligation" 
and is imposed upon any country violating an explicit international agreement, 
regardless of whether such violations are detected or punished.7 Most international 
lawyers such as Hudec8, Jackson9, Hoekman and Kostecki10  take a legalistic 
approach to DSMs, particularly supporting the WTO DSP's overall objective that: 
"DSP is a central element in providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system. It serves to preserve the rights and obligations of 
Members under the covered agreements and to clarify the existing provisions of those 
                                                          
5
 Staiger, Robert W., "International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy", NBER Working 
Paper, No.4962, 1994 
6
 Bagwell , K. and Staiger, R.W., "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of 
Regional Free Trade Areas", NBER Working paper, No.4363, 1993 
7
 Kovenock, D. and Thursby, M., "GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation", Economics 
and Politics, vol.4, no.2, 1992 
8
 Hudec, Robert, GATT Legal System and the World Trade Diplomacy, London: Butterworth, 
1990 
9
 Jackson, John H., The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic 
Relations, Cambridge. Mass.: The MIT Press, 1991 
10
 Hoekman, Bernard M. and Michel M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the Word 
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agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law (GATT Secretariat, 1994: 405)." 
Petersmann goes further with the contention that DSMs serve to achieve the 
broad goals of the agreements, i.e., the worldwide economic freedom, consumer 
welfare and democratic peace by restraining the over-representation of producer 
interests with asymmetric influence over their governments.11 
DSMs may provide gains for a multilateral enforcement mechanism by 
gathering and disseminating information under uncertainty generated by the 
unobservable NTBs. Hungerford emphasizes this information role of DSM, depicting 
the central enforcement problem in sustaining international trade agreements one of 
monitoring. DSMs provide a renegotiating forum when a dispute erupts.12 
But there are some counterarguments that DSM can be detrimental to trade 
liberalization when this information role is regarded as weak or unaffordable. Most of 
the past panel rulings are proved ineffective in compelling policy changes and serve 
just as an effective enforcer of the status quo. DSM has the effect of making potential 
retaliation less severe because any retaliation must be approved by both the deviating 
and retaliating countries under such agreements as GATT and NAFTA.13 Countries 
can punish cheating only by initiating a costly investigation of foreign actions, which 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Trading System: From GATT to WTO. Oxford University Press, 1995 
11
 Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law. 
International Organization and Dispute Settlement. London: Kluwer Law International, 
1997 
12
 Ludema, Rodney D., "Optimal International Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement 
Procedures", University of Western Ontario Working Paper, 1990 
13
 Ibid. 
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makes potential punishment less severe, resulting in higher levels of tariff or non-tariff 
barriers than without DSM. This problem worsens when the investigation fails to 
detect all the violations. Some scholars even points out that in some cases incentives 
for cooperation may be reduced as resorting to a DSM limits linkage of issues and 
iteration of the game.14 
Anyway, since the inception of the World Trade Organization in 1995 from 
what was previously the GATT, the organization has received both applauses and 
boos throughout the world. It collected its share of admiration as one of the most 
successful international organizations with a high rate of compliance15 as well as 
its share of condemnation as the epitome of the devil known as "globalization." 
Serious concerns such that this "overreaching" organization might jeopardize their 
national sovereignty or modify domestic rules were also raised in both 
developing and developed countries.16 
Faced with such turmoil, the Seattle Ministerial Meeting bore out to be a 
failure and the WTO at the time seemed to be threatened by the rampant and fierce 
opposition throughout the world. However, both the failure and antagonism 
proved two facts about the World Trade Organization. First, and somewhat ironically, 
                                                          
14
 Conybeare, John A., Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial 
Rivalry, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987 
15
 Faryar Shirzad, "Part I: Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU): Panel 1 
E: Unmasking the WTO: Access to the System: The WTO Dispute Settlement System: 
Prospects and Reform", Law and Policy in International Business (2000). 
16
 William J. Davey, "Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System exceeded its Authority? A 
Consideration of Deference shown by the System to Member Government Decisions and its 
Use of Issue-Avoidance Techniques" Journal of International Economic Law (2001), 79. 
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it is now no longer deniable that the WTO is in fact an influential international 
organization affecting almost every one of citizens in Member countries. Resistance 
against the WTO came from a wide variety of interest groups ranging from 
agricultural sectors to industrialized sectors. Such extensiveness confirms that the 
WTO and the decisions made at the WTO have direct impact on the constituents. 
Second, precisely because of the increase in importance, the WTO is now 
"burdened" with more controversial matters to deal with on its table. Although some 
express doubts and cynicism at results of Doha,17 it is noteworthy that numerous 
agendas have continuously been raised at the Conference including development issues, 
agriculture, the environment, investment, subsidies, least-developed countries, 
implementation issues, transparency, services, and dispute settlement procedures.18 
While the Member countries have differences in their opinion as to the degree of 
importance and priority each issue should receive one over another, it was evident that 
the discussion on the dispute settlement system, as one of the core subjects, has not yet 
seen its end.19 Commentaries such that there should be reforms to make the dispute 
settlement more efficient20 reveal that, although asserted a success of the WTO-era,21 
the legalistic aspects of the current dispute settlement procedures might not yet be 
                                                          
17
 Alan Wm. Wolff, "What Did Doha Do? An Initial Assessment" Journal of International 
Economic Law 5(1), 202. 
18
 Ministerial Declaration (Doha) World Trade Organization November 20, 2001, 2-9. 
19
 Jeffrey J. Schott, "Comment on the Doha Ministerial" Journal of International 
Economic Law (2002), 191-219. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement. Third edition (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 200. 
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complete for dealing with further disputes. 
As the binding force and automatic adoption of panel reports have been 
implemented in the dispute settlement procedures, the debate of whether to pursue 
either the diplomatic or legalistic approach seemed to have subsided with a 
triumph on the legalistic side.22 Thus, the dispute settlement system can be regarded 
as having more emphasis on the legalistic side than the previous diplomatic approach 
that was dominant during the GATT-era. However, it is also true that the dispute 
settlement system is not without diplomatic means within itself and that it still 
espouses the usage of such means.23 
Thus, particularly because of the expanded scope of issues to handle and 
also because of the fact that the diplomatic methods have not been proven useless, it 
is worthwhile to delve into the subject of these approaches and examine how the 
WTO dispute settlement has utilized the diplomatic and legalistic methods. 
 
3.2 How the Dispute Settlement System works? 
The WTO Disputes Settlement System embraces both negotiation and legal 
processes in reaching a resolution. The procedures are divided into three major 
stages when a party brings a case to the WTO. 24  First, the parties enter into 
consultations. When no agreement is reached, then the second stage involves the 
                                                          
22
 Michael Young, "Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over 
Diplomats" The International Lawyer, Summer 1995 Volume 29 Number 2, 396 
23
 The Dispute Settlement Understanding requires the consultations stage establishing a 
panel in Article 4 in Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes. 
24
 A detailed outline of the panel procedures is shown in [Figure 1] at the end of this chapter. 
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establishment of panels and rulings by the panels. Parties, if still dissatisfied, can 
appeal the rulings by the panels to the Appellate Body and resolutions are again 
sought at this third stage. During these processes, parties have a choice to settle 
the disputes through good offices, conciliation, or mediation. Implementation 
occurs either after the panel rulings or the Appellate Body's decisions. 
Although the dispute settlement procedure is labeled as the "panel process," 
it is apparent that the process contains further means of reaching resolutions. When 
the panel process and the Appellate Body Reviews can be categorized as formal panel 
processes, which involve decision-makings by an impartial and separate entities (the 
panels and the Appellate Body) through adjudicative means, there are alternatives to 
these formal processes (consultations, good offices, conciliation, and mediation), 
which are negotiation-oriented means of reaching agreed resolutions. Therefore, 
the panel process can be divided into two groups according to the nature of the means 
to reach resolutions. The first group, as shown in [Table 1], is rule-oriented procedures 
which are the panel process and the Appellate Body Review and the second group is 
negotiation-oriented procedures which are consultations, good offices, conciliation, 
and mediation. 
 
[Table 1] Classification of Dispute Settlement Procedures 
Rule-oriented Procedures Negotiation-oriented Procedures 
Panel Process Consultations 
Appellate Body Review Good offices, conciliation, and mediation 
 
 12 
One might argue that the division could not be so distinct or clear 
because stages such as consultations can be recognized as residing within the 
legalistic approach. However, when the parties involved in a case perform 
negotiations bilaterally without an impartial intermediary, it should be categorized as 
a means of diplomatic method. This integrated system of legal means and political 
means are significant in that they are reflected in the dispute settlement procedure 
(see [Table 1]) as well as throughout the entire-agreement (see [Table 2] at the end 
of this chapter). The current WTO dispute settlement panel process is described in 
detail as the follows. 
 
a. Consultations 
When a party brings a case to the WTO, the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding/DSU) requires the parties to enter into bilateral consultations. 25 
Consultations are considered as an imperative stage during the dispute settlement 
process because it compels parties to examine the complaint in a formal setting.26 It 
is, in effect, a prerequisite for proceeding to the adjudicative stages of the dispute 
settlement. By requiring consultations, the DSU encourages the parties to reach an 
agreement early in the dispute or at least identify common grounds and the 
                                                          
25
 Article 4 of the DSU. 
26
 William Davey, "WTO Dispute Settlement: Segregating the Useful Political Aspects and 
Avoiding "Over-Legalization," in New Directions in International Economic Law, ed. 
Macro Bronckers and Reinhard Quick (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 
293-295. 
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controversial issues of the case.27 However, it could be possible that a party to tries to 
resort to other means without a sense of urgency and prolong the process without any 
progress.28 In order to prevent such situation, the DSU explicitly sets time schedules 
for consultations stage. Parties have ten days to respond to a request, thirty days to 
"enter into consultations in good faith."29 and sixty days to reach a conclusion by the 
consultations process.30 This process could be expedited in cases of urgency in which 
ten days are provided to enter into the consultations and twenty days to reach a 
conclusion.31 The Dispute Settlement Understanding directs that the consultations 
occur with confidentiality of its content.32 
It may be pointed out this consultations stage is claimed to be significant 
for many disputes are settled in this stage.33 As will be analyzed later with empirical 
evidence, the consultation stage could be a very important "diplomatic" method 
continued from GATT-era to the WTO-era. In contrast, good offices, conciliation, 
and mediation have not been used extensively.34 
 
 
                                                          
27
 Dietk Ullrich "No Need for Secrecy? – Public Participation in the Dispute Settlement 
System of the World Trade Organization" 34 The University of British Columbia Law 
Review 55 (2000), 9-10.  
28
 Merrills, 201. 
29
 Article 4.3 of the DSU. 
30
 Article 4.7 of the DSU. 
31
 Article 4.8 of the DSU. 
32
 Article 4.6 of the DSU. 
33
 Merrills, 202. 
34
 Merrills, 204. 
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b. Good offices, Conciliation, and Mediation 
Unlike the consultations stage, good offices, conciliation, and mediation 
stage is a voluntary process with the agreement of the parties to the dispute within the 
WTO dispute settlement. 35  As the consultations, the proceedings are 
confidential,36 but the DSU does not require the procedure in the process, but they 
can be performed at all stages throughout the panel process.37 
These methods of consensual dispute resolution differ in the degree of the 
intercession by a third party. When the third neutral party provides additional 
channels of communication and encourages further talks, it is called good offices. 
Mediators perform more active roles than the ones in good offices by making 
proposals in the negotiation processes. In conciliation, the parties accede to have the 
third party to evaluate the facts and legal aspects which are non-judicial.38 
As to the individual who can conduct good offices, conciliation, or mediation, 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding authorizes the Director-General. 39  One 
notable feature of this section in the DSU is that it provides special procedures for 
least-developed countries. Upon the request of the least-developed member, good 
offices, conciliation, or mediation can be conducted after the consultations and 
before the establishment of the panel.40 
When one looks at these alternative procedures, it is evident that the dispute 
                                                          
35
 Article 5.1 of the DSU. 
36
 Article 5.2 of the DSU. 
37
 Article 5.3 of the DSU. 
38
 Ullrich, 10-11. 
39
 Article 5.6 of the DSU. 
40
 Article 24.2 of the DSU. 
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settlement mechanism promotes the usage of these negotiation-centered means in 
resolving disputes. It would also have been reasonable to expect more frequent uses 
of these means. However, to date, that has not been the case.41 
 
c. Panel Proceedings 
After the consultations stage, which is perceived as the "negotiating" phase of 
the dispute settlement proceedings, the legalistic step is initiated with a panel being 
requested and established.42 Both the panel proceedings and the Appellate Body reviews, 
discussed in the next section, are recognized as "quasi-judicial" stages because they 
mainly function as an adjudication process but also embody characteristics for 
consensual approaches to resolutions.43 The terms of reference are drawn up within 
twenty days after the panel establishment and the panel should be composed of 
panelists within ten days of the establishment of the panel. If no agreement is 
reached on the selection of panelists after twenty days, the Director-General is 
provided with ten more days to select panelists and form a panel.44 A panel report is 
issued to the parties to the dispute within six months from panel's composition, three 
months in urgency.45 The panel report is circulated within nine months from the date 
                                                          
41
 Faryar Shirzad, "Part I: Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU): Panel 1 
E: Unmasking the WTO: Access to the System: The WTO Dispute Settlement System: 
Prospects and Reform" 31 Law and Policy in International Business 769 (2000). 
42
 Article 6 of the DSU.  
43
 Ullrich, 11-12. 
44
 Article 6.7 of the DSU. 
45
 Article 12.8 of the DSU. 
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of the panel establishment.46 One key difference from GATT to the WTO is the 
adoption of the panel report after its circulation. The Dispute Settlement Body has 
to adopt the panel ruling within sixty days unless there is a consensus not to do so.47 
This was a move away from the adoption of rulings on positive consensus to 
negative consensus, where, in the former instance of the GATT, the adoption of the 
rulings were possible only when there was a consensus to do so, whereas, in the latter 
case, the rulings are automatically adopted unless there is a consensus not to do so. 
Therefore, before the inception of the WTO, any party, including the losing party, 
could prevent the adoption of a panel report whereas, currently, such possibility is 
eliminated with the automatic adoption of a panel report.48 
 
d. Appellate Body Review 
As the WTO dispute settlement acquired the rule of automatic adoption of 
panel reports, it has also created a means to appeal the panel report through a 
mechanism called the Appellate Body Review.49 Within sixty days, the involved party, 
but not a third party50, can appeal the panel report. The significance of the Appellate 
Review is that the Appellate Body is standing body comprised of individuals who 
                                                          
46
 Article 12.9 of the DSU. 
47
 Article 16.4 of the DSU. 
48
 Giorgio Sacerdoti "Appeal and Judicial Review in International Arbitration and 
Adjudication: The Cases of the WTO Appellate Review" in International Trade Law and the 
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, ed. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1997), 271. 
49
 Merrills, 208. 
50
 Article 17.4 of the DSU. 
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serve the Appellate Body terms. 51  The Appellate Body is composed of seven 
individuals, three of whom serve on one case.52 The time limit to the Appellate 
Review is maximum ninety days53 and unless a consensus not to adopt the appellate 
report is reached, it is also automatically adopted by the DSB.54 As for the scope of 
the review, the Appellate Body is limited to examine the law and the legal 
interpretation by the panel, not facts.55 In adoption, the same rule for panel reports 
apply to AB reports as they shall be "unconditionally accepted by the parties to the 
dispute" unless there is a consensus not to do so.56 
 
e. Implementation and Retaliation 
The panel or Appellate Body recommends that the violating member bring 
measures into conformity when they are found to be violating the GATT 
obligations. 57  According to Article 21, surveillance of implementation of 
recommendations and rulings is performed by the DSB for prompt 
compliance.58 Although ambiguities still remain as to what prompt compliance 
means, it is an essential principle in the implementation stage.59 Thus, the losing 
party is provided with a "reasonable period of time," which is "proposed by the party 
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and approved by the DSB" or "mutually agreed by the parties" or "determined 
through binding arbitration."60 
In cases of non-implementation, as temporary measures to full 
implementation, parties enter into negotiations for developing acceptable 
compensation.61 When no satisfactory compensation is agreed upon, the invoking 
party can suspend its concessions as mandated in Article 22.62 Compensation, if 
agreed by the parties involved, refers to a form of recompense whereas suspension of 
concessions refers to countermeasures. However, since such retaliatory measures run 
counter to the principle of the WTO,63 the DSU provides specific measures in order 
to control its effects thereby reducing the possibility of abuse which will end up 
thwarting the free flow international trade. 
 
f. Arbitration 
As another alternative means of settling disputes, the DSU provides 
"expeditious arbitration."64 Arbitration in dispute settlements occurs during the 
implementation stage under Articles 21 and 22.65 Procedures are left to the parties to 
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be agreed upon and, thus, the WTO played a limited role in arbitration.66 The 
parties are obligated to notify agreements and arbitration awards.67 
 
g. Significance of the Dispute Settlement Process 
With prompt timelines and the means to appeal, the dispute settlement 
mechanism is currently recognized as legalistic in its nature. The dispute 
settlement system is therefore an adjudicative system in which disputes are 
resolved through resorting to previously set and agreed rules. However, within the 
rules-oriented system, the dispute settlement mechanism embodies both diplomatic 
and legalistic means in resolving disputes. In the initiation stage of a dispute, the 
dispute settlement mechanism, by requiring consultations stage, promotes bilateral 
negotiation before resorting to the adjudication process. Alternative means to 
resolving disputes such as good offices, conciliation, or mediation are also available 
and encouraged during the entire proceedings of dispute settlements. 
Therefore, while recognized as an efficient legal tool for trade disputes, it is 
significant that the dispute settlement mechanism still incorporates diplomatic 
means through which it utilizes negotiating channels. Furthermore, the dispute 
settlement mechanism not only contains both negotiation and adjudication but also 
encourages the former prior to resorting to the latter. Hence, it is apparent that the 
dispute settlement mechanism recognizes the importance of the diplomatic ways of 
resolving trade frictions as well as it does the legalistic method in finding mutually 
agreed resolutions. 
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3.3 Different Types of DSMs: Negotiation vs. Adjudication 
DSMs take different forms across agreement. According to Reisman and 
Weidman (1995), the variations in DSMs result from the differences in features of 
various agreements and their political context.68  The key property of a DSM's 
structure under specific trade agreement is determined by five factors: (1) the scope 
of the economic exchanges called for in the agreement, (2) the number of participants, 
(3) the degree, intensity and effectiveness of internal support for and opposition to the 
agreement in each party, (4) the degree of resulting economic integration between the 
parties and (5) the power parity among the participants. 
A fundamental question arising in constructing and evaluation DSMs is 
whether they are primarily designed to adjudicate disputes or to mediate them.69 If the 
mediation is the goal, then the DSM must emphasize methods designed to encourage 
the contending parties to negotiate a solution to their dispute. If the adjudication is the 
goal, then the DSM must be able to apply the relevant rules consistently and ensure 
that the decisions produced by the system are implemented. 
In reality, all the DSMs adopt both diplomatic methods of dispute settlement 
(negotiation) and legal means of dispute settlements (adjudication) in varying 
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degrees and combinations. Each DSM uses specific techniques designed to fit 
different situations and to maximize the chances of dispute settlement by 
successive or alternative use of different methods. 
The diplomatic means of dispute settlement are characterized by (1) the 
flexibility of the procedures, (2) the control over the dispute by the parties, their 
freedom to accept or reject a proposed settlement and to retaliate, (3) the possibility 
of avoiding "winner-loser-situations" with their repercussions on the reputation of the 
Parties, (4) the only limited influence of legal considerations, and (5) the often larger 
influence of the current political processes in, and relative political weight of, each 
party.70 
The legal means of dispute settlement through arbitration and courts tend to 
be employed when the parties want to obtain rule-oriented, binding decisions in 
conformity with their mutually agreed long-term obligations and interests and prefer 
to avoid the various risks involved in diplomatic means of dispute settlement, e.g., 
dependence on the consent and good will of the defendant, and bilateral ad hoc 
solutions which may reflect the relative power of the parties rather than the merits 
of their case with weakening effect on the legal rules and their interpretations.71 
Yarbrough and Yarbrough categorize various DSMs into four types on the 
basis of the role and adjudicative power of the third-party: DSM I with third-party 
information provision, DSM II with non-binding third-party adjudication, DSM III 
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with binding third-party adjudication, and DSM IV with third-party enforcement.72 
DSM I is the least adjudicative system. It relies on a third party to 
investigate on violations and disseminate the finding. But retaliation is the only 
punishment and can occur unilaterally, subject to no restriction (see [Figure 2] at 
the and of this chapter). After a complaint, the designated third party conducts an 
investigation on the measure alleged as a violation. If it is found that there was no 
violation, the dispute ends, unless the complaining party unilaterally retaliates. 
Under a guilty ruling, the third party disseminates information regarding the 
defendant's violation to group members. If they decide to retaliate against the violator, 
the latter will either comply (and the dispute be settled) or resist (which leads to the 
continuation of the dispute or ostracism in the worst). If retaliation fails to provide a 
sufficient incentive for compliance or if group members fail to retaliate, the dispute 
continues. There always exists a possibility of unilateral retaliation without any 
sanction from group members, even when the third-party finds the defendant not 
guilty. (The examples of DSM I are medieval trade fairs and merchant guilds.) 
In DSM II with non-binding third-party adjudication, the third-party 
goes further than DSM I by recommending a remedy (see [Figure 3] at the and of 
this chapter). If the measure under investigation is found guilty, the third party 
suggests a recommended remedy to the dispute. The dispute ends when the 
defendant complies with the remedy. But its noncompliance brings about 
retaliation. If the retaliation fails to provide a sufficient incentive for compliance 
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or if the plaintiff fails to retaliate, the dispute may continue. The possibility of 
unilateral retaliation in the case of the third-party's not-guilty finding still exists since 
the third party adjudication is non-binding. 
An example of DSM II is NAFTA Chapter 20, which is designed to address 
all the disputes but antidumping and countervailing duty cases. The NAFTA Chapter 
20 panels as a third party issue a report and recommendations for a resolution, but 
the report can be overridden by a party to the dispute. Because compliance is not 
mandatory, there is no appeal procedure. Retaliation serves as the only recourse for a 
party who disagrees with the report and cannot otherwise negotiate an acceptable 
settlement. The dispute settlement procedure of the old GATT Article XXII and XXIII 
prior to WTO (Dispute Settlement Understandings) also resembles this type of 
non-binding third-party adjudication system. The defending nation has reserved a 
veto power to block the establishment of a panel, adoption of a panel report, and 
GATT's authorization of retaliation. Meanwhile, the complaining party was able lo 
retaliate unilaterally as a punishment without GATT's intervention. 
DSM III empowers the third-party with stronger binding adjudicative ability, 
a great leap forward from the two DSMs above (see [Figure 4] at the and of this 
chapter). It makes illegitimate unilateral retaliation taken after a not-guilty finding. 
Since multilateral legitimate retaliation always enforces compliance, the defendant 
has no choice but to follow when demanded. As a safety valve for non-compliance, 
the defendant is given the right to appeal against the panel's guilty finding. These 
procedures contain the expansion of the dispute and end all the disputes raised under 
this type of mechanism. 
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The WTO DSU (Dispute Settlement Understanding) and NAFTA Chapter 
19 procedures are good examples of DSM I I I  type. The WTO DSU procedures are 
a substantial improvement from the former GATT DSP with far shortened time limits, 
elimination of the defendant's veto power in establishing the panel, and shift from 
positive consensus to negative consensus in adopting a panel report. A narrowly 
defined appeal procedure and a more powerful function in monitoring and enforcing 
compliance make the DSU more adjudicative. More importantly, retaliation is 
authorized in nearly automatic way across multiple agreements in cases of 
noncompliance with the panel ruling. 
NAFTA Chapter 19 procedures for antidumping (AD) and countervailing 
duty (CVD) investigations also belong to the DSM III type. The NAFTA Chapter 
19 binational panel serves as a third party with binding adjudicative authority. 
Appeal against such binding panel reports is possible under an Extraordinary 
Challenge Committee with narrowly specified conditions. In addition, Chapter 19 
contains provisions to prevent a party from interfering with the panel process itself. 
Charges of such interference go to a special committee that, should it find evidence of 
interference, can authorize retaliatory suspension of Chapter 19 procedures or of 
other NAFTA benefits.  
DSM IV is the most adjudicative system, approximate to domestic legal 
system (see [Figure 5] at the and of this chapter). It differs from DSM III in a sense 
that it ensures third-party enforcement and replaces parties' right to retaliate with 
punishment. As in DSM III, all the disputes brought to DSM IV end without 
escalation of the dispute. The states' never-decreasing interest in national 
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sovereignty makes this type of DSM IV hard to achieve in international stage. 
Despite such constraints, the European Community has successfully developed its 
community law and court to the level of DSM IV with the introduction of 
majoritarian decision making and an authoritative legal system to enforce decisions 
so made. The Community law enforced by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is 
reminiscent of a domestic constitutional order with direct effect in the domestic law 
of member states. Suits alleging violation of Community law, therefore, can be 
brought in domestic courts. If individuals believe national law or a member state's 
behavior to be inconsistent with Community law, they may either petition through 
domestic courts for rulings from the ECJ or request the European Commission to 
petition the ECJ directly for a ruling. Either route can establish the supremacy of 
Community law. 
In summary, all of the DSMs vary along the continuum spanning 
negotiation dedication as Figure 6 shows.  
  
[Figure 6] The continuum between Negotiation and Adjudication 
Negotiation         Adjudication 
 
 
 
APEC  GATT   WTO   ECJ 
    FTA 18  FTA 19 
    NAFTA 20  FTA 19 
 
Most of the regional trade agreements such as Asia-Pacific Economic 
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Cooperation (APEC) have mere conciliation/negotiation provisions for disputes 
due to lack of consensus on a formal legalistic panel. At the other extreme lies the 
European Court of Justice, which provides the most adjudicative DSM, close to a 
domestic court system.  
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[Figure 1] The Panel Process* 
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60 days for panel 
report, unless appealed 
 
DSB adopts panel/appellate 
report(s) 
Including any changes to panel 
report made by appellate report 
(Art 16.1, 16.4, and 17.14) 
 
Appellate review 
(Art 16.4 and 17) 
max 90 days 
"Reasonable period of 
time" determined by: 
member proposes DSB 
agrees or parties in 
dispute agree; or 
arbitrator (approx 
15months if by 
arbitrator) 
 
Implementation 
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In cases of non-implementation 
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[Table 2] The Integrated WTO System of Legal and Political Means73 
 
Legal Methods of the WTO Political Methods of the WTO 
Panel Procedure (Arts. 6-16, 18, 19) Consultations (Art. 4) 
Appellate Review Procedure (Arts. 
17-19) 
Good offices (Art. 5, 24) 
Rulings by Dispute Settlement Body on 
Panel and Appellate Reports (Arts. 16, 
17) 
Conciliation (Arts. 5, 24) 
Private international arbitration  
(e.g. Art. 4 of the Agreement on 
Preshipment Inspection) 
Mediation (Arts. 5, 24) 
Recommendations by 
- Panels (Art. 19 
- Appellate Body (Art. 19) 
- Dispute Settlement Body (Arts. 16, 17) 
Surveillance of Implementation and 
Recommendations and 
Rulings (Art. 21) 
Domestic court proceedings  
(e.g. Art. X of the GATT, Art. 13 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement, Art. 23 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies, Arts. 32, 41-50 
of the TRIPS Agreement, Art. XX of the 
Agreement on Government 
Procurement)74 
Compensation and Suspension of 
Concessions (Art. 22) 
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[Figure 2] DSM I (third-party information provision) 
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[Figure 3] DSM II (non-binding third-party adjudication) 
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[Figure 4] DSM III (binding third-party adjudication) 
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[Figure 5] DSM IV (third-party enforcement) 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF THE APPROACHES TO THE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
 
4.1 Perspectives on the WTO's Dispute Settlement System 
Although it may seem too simplistic, the main approaches to the WTO 
dispute settlement can be categorized into two groups.75 The first one is a power or 
negotiation-oriented approach which refers to settling disputes through the usage of 
negotiation, and mediating disputes by encouraging parties to reach an agreement.76 
The second approach is a rule-oriented approach where disputes are settled by 
applying relevant rules and implementing results of the adjudicative process. As noted 
by one scholar, though neither of the extreme of the power-oriented approach nor the 
rule-oriented approach is ever reached in reality, 77  there have been unceasing 
discussions as to which one of these approaches the WTO dispute settlement should 
pursue. 
Whether to prefer one approach from the other, however, depends what the 
fundamental goal of the WTO is. The dispute settlement procedure involves finding 
out whether a member country has violated the GATT rules and ultimately stopping 
the alleged violation. Therefore, though finding out the violation is not less important, 
the principal goal of WTO dispute settlement must be set enforcement of rulings.78 As 
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a result, consideration on the approaches of the dispute settlement should be centered 
on how efficiently the implemented approach can achieve the goal. 
Some argue that diplomatic methods are more efficient for trade dispute 
settlement whereas some favor legalistic methods. The differences in their opinion are 
observed in this section followed by prominent scholarship and its criticisms. In 
considering two broad perspectives, this paper will describe the two as a 
"rule-oriented approach" and "negotiation-oriented approach." While the first 
approach will be designated as the "rule-oriented approach," a more specific 
examination of this approach will be performed in which a "rule-oriented approach" 
will denote a narrower implication within the broad approach. The second term 
"negotiation-oriented approach" refers to the "diplomatic" or "power" oriented 
approach. 
 
4.1.1 Rule-Oriented Approach 
a. What is a "Rule-Oriented" System? 
A "rule-oriented" approach refers to settling disputes by applying relevant 
norms or rules that parties have previously agreed.79 Within this system, settling 
disputes involves adjudication and implementation of the decisions.80 
First, those who support this adjudicative system advocate that the 
rule-oriented system has clear and set rules that provide predictability in international 
trade dispute settlements.81 When such predictability exists, the system can provide 
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stability because participants can predict the outcomes of the adjudication processes. 
Predictability and stability are important in international affairs where millions of 
transactions are performed by various participants.82 Second, the rule-oriented system 
can provide consistency and transparency because previously set rules are applied in 
this system. The system produces consistent outcomes according to clearly set rules 
which, in turn, also contribute to producing predictability. Third, the effectiveness of 
the rule-oriented system resides in the fact that the system requires time limits to 
settling disputes83 as the DSU does. In this way, the possibility that an alleged violator 
continues its wrong practice by prolonging the dispute settlement is considerably 
reduced. Fourth, some argue that the rule-oriented system promotes better compliance 
because it induces members to follow the rules which they themselves have agreed 
upon. When the party does not comply with the rulings, it will be labeled as a 
rule-violator, which is detrimental in international relations, and such embarrassment, 
more likely, will not be the only punishment it will have to suffer.84  Fifth, the 
rule-oriented system is more beneficial for developing countries.85 When compared to 
a negotiation/diplomacy-oriented system, the rule-oriented system involves less 
power struggle in dispute settlements. Therefore developing countries, usually the 
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less-powerful when confronted by a developed country, can worry less about their 
relative power positions. Sixth, this system is capable of identifying and sanctioning 
cheating.86 When previously set rules exist, it is easier to distinguish cheaters from 
rule-abiders by referring to those rules. When no such rules exist, however, it will be 
harder to identify let alone penalize violators. Seventh, one can avoid real "trade 
warfare" when rules exist within a system because the rule-oriented system produces 
reciprocity based on fair trade.87  When parties believe the rules exist based on 
reciprocity, trade warfare is unlikely to be invoked and "playing by the rules" becomes 
the norm in trade disputes. Eighth, the rule-orientedness in a system reduces domestic 
pressure for more protectionist measures88 whereas domestic political pressures can 
have an effect on the international policy outcomes when the system is based on 
negotiated basis with domestic interested players influencing the negotiators.89 
Although argued as preferable to the negotiation-oriented approach for above 
reasons, some argue that the rule-oriented system has limitations. First, this approach 
is considered rigid and immutable.90 Because of its inflexibility, the rule-oriented 
system is often incapable of meeting the needs of safety valves when the outcomes of 
the system are deemed to be illegitimate.91 Illegitimate outcomes, here, refer to those 
that are unable to be applied for special reasons such as extreme economic problems 
of the violating party. Second, it is argued that this rule-oriented system is less 
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effective in the sense that it cannot induce application and implementation.92 Whereas 
the goal of the WTO dispute settlement is determined to be enforcement, adjudication 
itself does not provide obligatory requirement to adhere to the rulings. If and when 
non-compliance frequently occurs, it will have a devastating effect on the system itself. 
Third, some argue that one weakness of this system rests on the fact that trade disputes 
are inherently secret.93 Trade disputes were settled by diplomatic means and it has 
been important to keep them secret, for one, to conclude the negotiation as soon as 
possible, and two, to prevent spilling-outs of issues to other sectors of the involved 
countries' international affairs. 94  Fourth, such adjudicative system "poisons the 
atmosphere" by increasing the hostility between countries involved in the dispute 
settlement process.95 Legal disputes are described as either "triumph" or "defeat" (win 
vs. lose) situation and not as "settled." Although law is "meant" to be unemotional and 
detached, such features do not apply to those involved who often become 
antagonized.96 Such undesirable environment would not work to benefit the system as 
a whole as much as it would the individual participants. Fifth, it is possible that 
"wrong" cases might be brought to the dispute settlement system.97 Here, "wrong" 
cases refer to those brought to the WTO for unavoidable violation and/or those cases 
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relating to issues not yet settled at the WTO. These cases generate enough controversy, 
some argue, which in so doing can undermine the whole WTO system.98 Sixth, 
transparency, which entails publicity, could lead to connecting of other issues with the 
trade dispute affair, which would not be desirable. When issues other than the trade 
dispute at hand get involved in the settlement process, it could domestic opposition 
that could impede efficient settlements of disputes.  
Despite such criticisms, some argue for more rule-oriented system m order to 
heighten the benefits of the positive aspects discussed above. An argument in the 
direction for more rule-orientedness is what is termed "constitutionalism." 
 
b. Constitutionalism 
Constitutionalism put forth by Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and other 
supporters, calls for more "constitutional functions" of the WTO law. 99 
Constitutionalism links human rights law to GATT/WTO law and emphasizes the 
needs for building legitimate constituency at the WTO.100 
The need for "constitutionalization" of the WTO dispute settlement system 
can be observed as twofold. First, constitutionalization is argued for by maintaining 
that it is adequate to link the human rights law with the GATT/WTO law.101 The 
principle of human rights law lies in the pursuit of individual freedom and equal 
                                                          
98
 Ibid. 
99
 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "The WTO Constitution and the New Millennium Round" in 
New Directions in International Economic Law, ed. Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick, 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 130. 
100
 Petersmann, 117-130. 
101
 Petersmann, 130. 
 40 
opportunities, which coincides with the objectives of the WTO law.102 In order to 
establish constitutional democracy, countries derive its legitimacy by protecting 
human rights which are mainly non-discrimination, rule of law, and individual 
freedom.103 It is asserted that because WTO laws also pursue similar principles of 
non-discrimination and extension of individual freedom, such legal principles lead to 
"transnational extension of constitutional democracy."104 
Second, one main institutional change from GATT to the WTO requires such 
constitutionalization, namely, the transformation from "negative integration" to 
"positive integration."105 As the WTO evolved into a system of positive integration, 
the member countries can no longer avoid obligates by merely refraining from 
prohibited practices (as the concept of negative integration) but have to alter or their 
domestic laws or craft new laws in order to comply with the WTO requirements (with 
positive integration). 106  Such international harmonization necessitates building 
legitimate political constituency in the WTO because the harmonization process will 
be impeded by doubts in the existence of democratic legitimacy of the WTO.107 Since 
it is impossible to "undo" the process of inevitable harmonization of international 
trade laws, it is necessary to build democratic legitimacy, which bases the domestic 
legal systems of the member countries. Therefore, when such constitutional 
democratic institutions are built into the WTO system, it would produce the effect of 
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strengthening the rule-oriented system. 
Some, however, express serious concerns and doubts to such pursuit of 
constitutional legitimacy at the WTO. First, as argued by one scholar, the WTO's 
current system exercises binding force of its rulings but lacks considerable amount of 
democracy in the institution, which is translated as a legitimacy gap.108 However, 
unlike domestic constitutions, it is very difficult to obtain such democratic legitimacy 
in the WTO laws because of the inherent nature of international trade relations; being 
without a central governing authority whether it be democratic or not.109 
Therefore, it is argued that the harmonization can pose a threat to domestic 
constitutions of the member countries.110 Another problem of the above-discussed 
"constitutionalism" that is pointed out is that the advocates assert their arguments on a 
too narrow definition of "human rights" in the context of the "public choice theory", 
thus emphasizing the individual's right to import and end up overlooking the fact that 
constituents do not always prefer protectionism. 111  In sum, the WTO dispute 
settlement system does not yet meet the criteria to move towards "constitutionalism" 
because of its legitimacy gap due to its lack of "democratic legitimacy"112 and narrow 
view of "individual rights."113 
Positioned at a farther end of the spectrum toward the rule-based system, 
"constitutionalism" is pursued by those who try to augment the individual human 
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rights on an international level. However, legitimacy gap caused by the lack of 
institutional democracy hinders further development of constitutionalism. 
 
c. Rule-Oriented Approach 
A less extreme approach on the "rule-oriented" side than constitutionalism is 
the concept of what is referred to as "Rule-oriented Approach" put forth mainly by 
Professor John H. Jackson.114 Although identical terms of the "rule-orientedness" are 
used, the one discussed earlier indicates one of the broadly divided rule-negotiation 
dichotomy, whereas, in this section, it refers to what Professor Jackson specifically 
terms "rule-orientedness" within the overall approach. 
The first feature to be noted in the rule-oriented approach is that this approach 
is differentiated from "rule of law" or "rule-based" system.115 In this sense, rule 
orientation is also distinguished from constitutionalism. The rule-oriented approach 
suggests more flexibility to the system in contrast to "rule-based" system116 but does 
not center on negotiation as in the "negotiation-oriented" system, therefore placing 
itself somewhere between these two ends of the spectrum, while shifting to the "rules" 
side. The reason for such fluidity is that the "rule-oriented" approach does not endorse 
a complete exclusion of negotiation in approaching dispute settlements. Rather, the 
point is on the negotiation or settlement of disputes but only that it specifies an 
approach to such negotiation. Therefore, with the "rule-oriented" approach, dispute 
settlements are performed through both application of rules and the use of negotiation. 
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Second, while the procedural aspect of the 'rule-oriented' system can be 
described as a rule application, the emphasis of this approach is found in the 
perception of participants to the dispute settlement process. Proponents of this 
approach suggest that the essential factor in dispute settlements is what the 
participants perceive as "bargaining chips". 117 In a dispute settlement process with no 
previously agreed-upon rules, the involved parties perceive their relative "power 
positions"118 as their basis for negotiating and deriving resolutions.119 Thus, in such 
situations, the party in a relatively lower power position would have to confront the 
other party who can utilize this situation and make "implicit or explicit threats" or 
"flex its muscles" upon the weaker party.120 The negotiators would also have to deal 
with domestic influence 121  which usually and probably will endorse more 
protectionist measures. However, when both parties know that there are certain rules 
to be applied, when the settlement comes to an impasse, the participants pay attention 
to the rules and the predicted outcomes.122 This is the feature that would make the 
dispute settlement system more efficient and predictable.  
The third feature of the "rule-oriented" approach pertains to today's 
international economic situation. It is undeniable that there are millions of 
international transactions which are driven by market mechanisms in today's 
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integrated and decentralized world.123 The least wanted, for that reason, is ambiguity 
and unpredictability caused by negotiations resolved through relative power positions. 
It is asserted that the rule-oriented system provides predictability and credibility in the 
world trading system particularly full of interdependence and intricacy with numerous 
participants.124 The ability to predict outcomes of dispute settlements by rule-oriented 
approach and the reliability on such system creates stability to further investment and 
operation of markets.125 
Though it may be true that the history of civilization proves a move away 
from a power-oriented system toward a rule-oriented system and that it is natural that 
a human institution such as the GATT/WTO also does,126  some issues such as 
sovereignty or differences of culture between member countries subsist in spite of the 
existence of strong argument for the "rule-orientedness". Some argue that despite the 
increase of participation of non-governmental organizations accompanied by the 
revolution in communication, sovereignty still resides with the governments and that 
the dispute settlement process as rule-oriented as it is, should not become more 
rigid.127 Therefore, the need to examine another approach to dispute settlement rises, 
which could supplement the shortcomings of the "rule-oriented" approach. 
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4.1.2 Negotiation-Oriented Approach 
At the other side of the spectrum lies what can be termed a 
"negotiation-oriented" approach. Here, the "negotiation-oriented" approach is 
identical to dispute settlements through "diplomacy" 128 , "power" 129 , and 
"pragmatism".130  With the "negotiation-oriented" approach, disputes are resolved 
usually by bilateral negotiations between countries. Historically, the GATT system 
leaned more on this less legal and rigid approach dominated by negotiated 
outcomes.131 When negotiation was the main means of settling disputes under GATT, 
the legal system was seen as a part of a continuous process within the diplomatic 
procedure.132 The WTO dispute settlement moved itself away from the diplomatic 
approach through the Uruguay Round negotiations and towards the 
rule-orientedness. 133  Nevertheless, the dispute settlement mechanism does not 
embrace the rule-oriented approach as its sole method but integrates various features 
of deriving negotiated outcomes. Thus, an analysis of the "negotiation-oriented" 
approach is valuable in understanding the means in achieving the WTO's principal 
goal of dispute settlements and enforcement.134 
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This section examines the arguments for and against the "negotiation-oriented 
approach" and analyzes the strengths and weaknesses in settling disputes through the 
diplomatic approach. 
Advocates of the negotiation-oriented approach assert that disputes are settled 
in a mutually advantageous manner by negotiation.135  The biggest and strongest 
support for this argument is that trade disputes are closed and internal matter in their 
nature.136 The objective of a dispute settlement, whatever the mechanism it uses, is to 
resolve disputes in the most swift and efficient way.137 In conjunction with the main 
objective, the aim is to prevent spill-overs of the dispute into other areas of 
international relations.138 Therefore, trade disputes are at best when left to quietly 
settled negotiation processes rather than relatively more open adjudication process. 
Another principal reason for preferring the diplomatic way of dispute 
settlements is flexibility.139 The need for flexibility in trade disputes has its roots in the 
intrinsic nature of international relations. Where there exists no central authority in 
international affairs, countries are exposed to different conditions in various disputes 
which the legal approach cannot satisfactorily manage. The "negotiation-oriented" 
approach offers room for maneuvers in each stage of dispute settlements.140 Thus, the 
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negotiation-oriented approach is better suited for "safety valve" issues as well as 
dealing with difficulties developing countries face in trying to mean international 
standards.141 One problem of adjudication could arise from a situation where the 
violator cannot, as opposed to would not, implement changes to conform to set 
regulations. While rule-based perspective does not provide a feasible answer to such 
problems, diplomatic approach can produce adjustments for special circumstances. 
Therefore, especially, developing countries can avoid implementing higher 
international standards which are detrimental to their economic standings. 
Those who support the negotiation-oriented approach argue that it is more 
pragmatic to settle disputes through negotiations than litigation.142 The negotiated 
outcome is more practical for implementation would be more likely. Although the 
adjudication produces rulings, there is no guarantee that the violator, when found at 
fault, might decide not to implement changes or could be unable to conform to the 
decision. Then, the adjudication process would end up obsolete by failing to achieve 
the goal of implementation. Accordingly, outcomes through bilateral negotiations 
would guarantee the enforcement at least better than the impartial adjudication 
process would. Additionally, mediating disputes compared to litigating cases would 
encourage parties to come to an agreement in a more peaceful way than 
confrontation.143 
However, the negotiation-orientedness has several disadvantages for efficient 
dispute settlements. First, since negotiation is done on case by case basis, the system 
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would not be able to create adequate benchmarks.144 The lack of general standards 
would cause inconsistency in international trade affairs unlike the rule-oriented 
system which is capable of providing some measures of predictability. 145  The 
inconsistent behavior on the part of the involved countries would result in ambiguity 
for further disputes in the future. 
Another key criticism to the negotiation-oriented approach is that the 
negotiation processes rely on relative power positions of the participants. When two 
countries are involved in a dispute, the more powerful of the two could make "explicit 
and implicit threats"146 to the less powerful. These threats can take various forms that 
could reach outside of the trade disputes themselves. They could involve measures 
relating to security or even retaliation in industries other than the dispute. Such usage 
of relative political or economic strength would allow the more powerful to muscle 
their way through rather than applying fairness. 
Another inherent weakness pointed out of the diplomatic technique is the 
possibility of influence by domestic constituents. When citizens recognize their ability 
to make their demands heard, it will be most likely that they will demand protectionist 
policies which would impede the negotiation process and make it more difficult to 
reach a solution. Therefore, the negotiation-oriented approach becomes harder to 
reach a resolution in dispute settlements than applying previously set rules. 
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4.2 Empirical Analysis 
How dispute settlements are actually settled at the WTO is important in 
assessing which approach is more efficient in achieving the WTO's goal. Efficiency in 
dispute settlements refers to the method's capacity to achieve the WTO's fundamental 
goal of reaching a mutually agreed resolution as well as its enforcement. It is, 
therefore, necessary to compare the number of cases resolved by each method 
identified either as negotiation-oriented or rule-oriented methods. For the comparison, 
as discussed earlier, the consultations and good offices, conciliation, and mediation 
processes are categorized as negotiation-oriented whereas the panel procedure and the 
appellate review are regarded as rule-oriented. 
 
4.2.1 Empirical Comparison 
Since the inception of the WTO, there have been 329 complaints brought to 
the dispute settlement mechanism to year 2005.147 But in this work I want to review 
only a part (to be correct about 73.5%) of all cases, until the year 2002. I base in my 
analyze on reliable work of Marion Panizzon and Young Duk Park "WTO Dispute 
Settlement 1995-2001: A Statistical Analysis".148 As shown in [Table 5] until January 
1, 2002, 128 cases have been settled which is 53% of all the cases and 114 cases were 
still in progress composing 47% of all the cases. 
 
 
                                                          
147
 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_ e.htm 
148
 Marion Panizzon and Young Duk Park, "WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2001: A 
Statistical Analysis," Journal of International Economic Law (2001): 221-244. 
 50 
[Table 5] Number and Share of Cases from 1995-2002 
Dispute status (as of 2001) Complaints Share 
Total cases 242 100% (of 242) 
Cases in Progress 114 47% (of 242) 
Cases Settled 128 53% (of 242) 
 
a. Usage of Rule-Oriented vs. Negotiation-Oriented Methods 
As shown in [Table 6], among 128 resolved cases, 70 cases were resolved 
through the adoption of panel or appellate body reports by the Dispute Settlement 
Body. 39 complaints were settled bilaterally, of which 35 were notified to the DSB 
under Article 3.6149 and 4 were not notified.150 Of the nineteen cases settled in other 
ways, nine were settled through withdrawal of the complaints 151 , seven were 
settlements through inaction152, and three were other forms153. None of the complaints 
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were settled through good offices, conciliation, or mediation process. 
 
[Table 6] Various Means of Resolution 
Methods of Resolution Relevant Articles Complaints Share 
Panel or Appellate Body 
Reports Adopted by the DSB 
DSU Articles 16.4 
& 17.14 
70 55% (of 128) 
Resolved Bilaterally DSU Article 3.6 39 30% (of 128) 
Other Ways DSU Articles 3.7, 
12.12 and others 
19 15% (of 128) 
Voluntary Arbitration DSU Article 25 0 0% (of 128) 
Good offices, Conciliation or 
DSU 
Article 5 0 0% (of 128) 
 
[Table 7] is a rearrangement of [Table 6] identifying the resolutions according 
either "rule-oriented" or "negotiation-oriented" approaches. 55% of the settled 
complaints were resolved through the adjudication process of the WTO's dispute 
settlement system. Disputes were also resolved through "diplomatic" ways or 
"negotiation-oriented" method by mutual agreements. These include 39 cases, of 
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which, however, none involved the usage of good offices, conciliation, or mediation. 
 
[Table 7] Rule-oriented vs. Negotiation-oriented Resolutions 
Approaches Methods of Resolution Complaints Share 
"Rule-oriented" Panel and Appellate Body 
Reports 
70 55% (of 128) 
"Negotiation-oriented" Bilateral resolution, Good 
offices, Conciliation or 
Mediation 
39+0  30% (of 128) 
Other ways Withdrawal, Amendment, 
Expiration, Inaction 
19 15% (of 128) 
 
b. Cases settled through Panel or Appellate Body Review 
[Table 8] shows that there were 57 panel reports issued as of January 1, 2002. 
Of those cases, for 2 cases, time for appeal has not run out.154 Among the 57 panel 
reports adopted by the DSB, 41 were appealed which amounts to 75%.155 
 
 
 
                                                          
154
 Panizzon and Park, 229; DS 176 and DS 202. 
155
 Panizzon and Park, 229; Panel reports adopted by the DSB without appeal are as the 
follows: DS44, DS54+DS55+DS59+DS64, DS79, DS99, DS114, DS126, DS132, DS152, 
DS155, DS156, DS160, DS163, DS179, DS189, and DS194; Refer to the Appendix for the 
list of cases. 
 53 
[Table 8] Panel vs. Appellate Body Review 
Disputes Complaints Share 
Total Panel Reports 57156 100% (of 57) 
Time not run out for appeal 2 3% (of 57) 
Appellate Review 41 75% (of 55) 
 
[Table 9] shows the results of the Appellate Body Reviews. Of 39 cases less 
than half, 41% (16 cases), were upheld with some modifications in 5 cases whereas 
more than half, 59% were reversed either in part or whole. 
 
[Table 9] The Outcome of Appellate Body Review 
Appellate Body Rulings Matters Share 
All upheld 11 28% (of 39) 
Upheld with modifications 5 13% (of 39) 
SUB TOTAL – UPHELD 16 41% (of 39) 
Upheld in Part, Reversed in Part 21 54% (of 39) 
All reversed  2 5% (of 39) 
SUB TOTAL – REVERSED 23 59% (of 39) 
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4.2.2 Significance of the Empirical Evidence 
The statistics above raise several considerations of the WTO dispute 
settlement system. The apparent feature of the statistics is that between 1995-2001 
there were no cases resolved through alternative means of settling disputes i.e. good 
offices, conciliation, or mediation. While the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
explicitly maintains that "the aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a 
positive solution to a dispute" and "a solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a 
dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred,"157 the 
empirical evidence seems prove that "mutually acceptable" outcomes by the 
adjudication process are preferred to the parties than outcomes through bilateral 
negotiation. 
However, whereas none of the were cases settled through good offices, 
conciliation, or mediation, 39 cases, comprising 30% of all cases were resolved 
bilaterally. This proves that bilateral negotiations are still a substantial part of settling 
disputes at the WTO and that they are not dispensable. Assuming that these bilateral 
resolutions lean more on the "negotiation-oriented" approach as decided above, it 
would be imprecise to claim that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
predominantly employs legalistic approach. Rather, the WTO dispute settlement still 
retains diplomatic aspects of the pre-WTO era and complements the legal mechanisms, 
i.e. panel proceedings and Appellate Review. 
Additionally, when there exists a major portion of the disputes settled through 
bilateral negotiations, it gives some support for utilizing similar diplomatic methods 
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such as good offices, conciliation or mediation. The question, nonetheless, remains as 
to why none of the cases were able to use such methods. One major impediment to the 
usage of those alternative means is the voluntary nature of these procedures. Whereas 
consultations stage is compulsory prior to the establishment of a panel, institutional 
and procedural problems rise when there are no specific requirements in engaging in 
good offices, conciliation or mediation processes. Member countries involved in 
disputes, after the consultations stage, might end up regarding such negotiation 
process as ineffective. 
Comparison of the cases settled after the panel stage with those appealed for 
the Appellate Body Review furthermore raises some inquiries. Presuming that the 
most frequent reason for appeals to the Appellate Body is dissatisfaction with the 
panel rulings by either one or more parties to the dispute, the rate reaching 75%158 
indicates that 3/4 of the panel rulings are unacceptable to one or more, if not all, of the 
parties involved at the dispute. The outcomes of the Appellate Body Review are also 
noteworthy. The fact that more than half of the cases amounting to 59% of the 
appealed complaints were reversed reveals that the panel rulings could be unreliable 
to some extent. This can be an indication that "rule-oriented" aspects of the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism by itself is not complete and that it could be 
supplemented with other means in deriving the mutually agreed resolutions. 
When perceiving the ultimate object of the dispute settlement as obtaining 
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mutually agreed resolutions according to the WTO laws and enforcing their outcomes, 
it becomes evident that weaknesses of the adjudicatory process could be 
complemented with other mechanisms that facilitate the process of achieving the basic 
goal of the organization. As the statistics show, diplomatic or "negotiation-oriented" 
methods are still being utilized together with "rule-oriented" system which proves to 
be not completely efficient by itself. The two observed aspects of the current dispute 
settlement system, i.e. continued utilization of diplomatic means and limitations of the 
usage the rule-oriented approach, demonstrate that a further move away from or a 
neglect of the diplomatic means toward the more legalistic approach should be 
reconsidered. As argued by one scholar, too much emphasis on the legalization could 
lead to "over-legalization" and result in highlighting "form over substance,"159 which 
could end up having an effect of neglecting or abandoning effective means in 
achieving the fundamental goal of the WTO dispute settlement system.  
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Table 3. Rule-Oriented Approach 
ADVOCACY CRITICISM 
• Clear rules 
• Predictable 
• Stable 
• Consistent 
• Transparent 
• Time limits (promptness) 
• Better compliance a 
• Beneficial for developing countries b 
• Capable of identifying and 
sanctioning cheating 
• Avoids real "trade warfare" 
• Reduces domestic pressures 
• Rigid thus immutable 
• Ineffective in application and 
implementation 
• Secrecy not guaranteed 
• "Poisons the atmosphere" c 
• Hostility aroused 
• Incapable of dealing with "wrong" 
cases 
• Unnecessary links to other issues 
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 Advocates of the rule-oriented approach argue that the system induces better compliance 
because the previously agreed rules compel the members to follow the rules. Otherwise, the 
rule-breaker will be labeled as a violator, the reputation of which, is detrimental in 
international relations. Advocates of negotiation-oriented approach, on the other hand, argue 
that compliance and implementation will be easier through negotiation-oriented approach 
because the parties are able to settle on the implementation methods and means while the 
negotiation proceeds, which is more realistic than the rule-oriented approach. 
b
 Rule-orientedness is beneficial for developing countries in the way that the most powerful 
are not able to make threats because every member has to obey certain set rules. However, 
negotiation-orientedness could also benefit developing countries because the system can 
provide the developing countries with safety valves thereby able to adjust negotiation 
outcomes on the basis of their developmental situation. 
c
 "Poisoning the atmosphere" refers to creating hostility through the notion of "win" vs. 
"lose" in litigation processes. The rule-orientedness might, some worry, create such 
environment when unnecessary and unintended. 
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Table 4. Negotiation-Oriented Approach 
ADVOCACY CRITICISM 
• Inherent nature of trade disputes – 
closed and internal 
• Flexible  
• "Safety-valve" function 
• Better implementation d 
• Beneficial for developing countries e 
• More pragmatic 
 
• No adequate benchmarks 
• Inconsistency  ambiguity  
• Reliance on relative power positions  
• Usage of explicit or implicit threats  
• Susceptible to domestic influence  
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 Advocates of the rule-oriented approach argue that the system induces better compliance 
because the previously agreed rules compel the members to follow the rules. Otherwise, the 
rule-breaker will be labeled as a violator, the reputation of which, is detrimental in 
international relations. Advocates of negotiation-oriented approach, on the other hand, argue 
that compliance and implementation will be easier through negotiation-oriented approach 
because the parties are able to settle on the implementation methods and means while the 
negotiation proceeds, which is more realistic than the rule-oriented approach. 
e
 Rule-orientedness is beneficial for developing countries in the way that the most powerful 
are not able to make threats because every member has to obey certain set rules. However, 
negotiation-orientedness could also benefit developing countries because the system can 
provide the developing countries with safety valves thereby able to adjust negotiation 
outcomes on the basis of their developmental situation. 
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CHAPTER V 
PROSPECTS AND THE "PRINCIPLE-ORIENTED" APPROACH 
 
Though the argument that neither of the two extremes is never reached in 
reality gains an extensive amount of validity,160 whether the WTO should approach 
the dispute settlement mechanism either with rule-orientedness or 
negotiation-orientedness is still of considerable debate. Some keen observers of the 
WTO dispute settlement system argue that the organization has now passed along 
three stages of its development; namely, power-oriented to rule-oriented, and finally 
to a principle-oriented system.161 Fundamental principles such as trade liberalization, 
non-discrimination, respect of sovereignty, sustainable development, cooperation, 
multilateralism, transparency, rule of law, and proportionality are recognized as 
underlying the current WTO system.162 
These are apparently embodied in the WTO laws as well as reports produced 
by the Appellate Body.163 Such argument seems convincing when one searches for 
what lie underneath the current system of complicated and intricate trade economic 
rules. However, although it might be true that the organization is making another 
move from the current system to the one with embedded principles as its foundations, 
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the methodological features of approaching the settlements of disputes should still be 
considered on the "negotiation-rule oriented" spectrum. Procedural aspects remain as 
yet in the field of "diplomacy versus rules" and it will probably remain although the 
institution does make a leap to a "principle-oriented" system. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
Since its inception in 1995, the World Trade Organization, as the successor to 
GATT, has demonstrated its efficiency in settling trade disputes through legalistic 
means supported by binding force on its member countries. As international economic 
interdependence has increased with the pursuit of free trade, the issue of settling trade 
disputes has become a crucial matter of concern for nation-states as well as firms and 
individuals across the world. The WTO has received both approval and contempt for 
its success as an effective institution to resolve trade disputes and as a contributor to 
the controversial trend called "globalization". Amidst these unceasing controversies 
concerning this international "court" for trade, one evident fact is that the WTO is now 
an imperative international organization in terms of its functions as a dispute 
settlement mechanism. Therefore, part of the essence of the WTO lies in how the 
dispute settlement system works and through what means it tries to gain efficiency in 
resolving disputes. 
With binding force and the automatic adoption of reports, the WTO has 
transformed itself into a more legalistic organization. However, while the overall 
structure is considered as an adjudicative system, the dispute settlement mechanism 
incorporates both diplomatic and legalistic means in obtaining resolutions for disputes 
by requiring bilateral negotiation processes as a prerequisite for panel procedures. 
This paper, thus, argues that the WTO dispute settlement system should function by 
applying both rule-oriented and negotiation-oriented approaches. Through such 
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means, the WTO should be better able to achieve its fundamental goal of reaching 
mutually agreed resolutions and enforcing the rulings. 
The DSS resolves disputes between Members through the exercise of 
compulsory jurisdiction over all Members (no Member can refuse to answer a 
complaint brought against it). It is empowered to make rulings and recommendations, 
and to authorize sanctions that are widely viewed as binding upon the defaulting 
Member. 
The DSS is open to claims by any Member against any other Member. The 
formal rules of standing to bring a complaint, or to participate as a third party to a 
complaint are liberal. Any Member that considers its WTO benefits are being 
impaired by another Member may protect its interests by calling for the establishment 
of an ad hoc panel, or by appealing the decision of such a panel to the WTO's 
standing Appellate Body. Panel and Appellate Body reports become binding on the 
disputants when they are adopted, by a rule of "negative consensus" (which requires 
all Members present to agree to block the report) by the WTO Membership sitting as 
the Dispute Settlement Body. 
This thesis first argues that the current dispute settlement system contains both 
negotiation-oriented aspects and rule-oriented aspects within its procedures. The 
negotiation-oriented approach can be observed in stages of consultations, good offices, 
conciliation, and mediation whereas the rule-oriented approach is found at the panel 
procedures and the Appellate Body reviews. The significance of the dispute 
settlement mechanism is that it recognizes the importance of the negotiation-oriented 
approach by requiring a consultation stage before the panel process and leaving the 
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option of good offices, conciliation, and mediation as alternative means for resolution 
available at any stage. 
This paper then analyzes the "rule-oriented" and "negotiation-oriented" 
approaches by comparing the arguments for and against both approaches. Advocates 
for the "rule-oriented" approach argue that it provides predictability and consistency 
which in turn produces stability in today's integrated economic world. Abiding by 
previously agreed and set rules also provides transparency and better compliance by 
the parties involved and the rules makes it easier to identify and sanction cheating. 
Rules also reduce the possibility of domestic pressures and benefits developing 
countries who are not as easily influenced by relative power positions of developing 
countries in trade disputes. However, this approach is criticized for features such as 
rigidity and ineffective implementation and unnecessary openness and consequent 
linkage to unrelated issues. 
The "negotiation-oriented" approach, on the other hand, is supported for its 
flexibility and pragmatism. It induces better compliance because, through 
negotiations, the parties are able to reach more "practical" resolutions to the disputes. 
With the "negotiation-oriented" approach, the dispute resolution system can provide 
"safety-valves" for countries that cannot meet the international standards. However, 
the "negotiation-oriented" approach has shortcomings for it is regarded as unable to 
provide adequate benchmarks thus causing ambiguity and inconsistency. Countries 
are also susceptible to relative power positions with each other and also vulnerable to 
domestic influence.  
The analysis of cases from 1995 to 2002 demonstrates that although with 
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weakness exists, both approaches are used in settling disputes at the WTO. Of 128 
cases that were settled through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism since 1995 till 
2002, 39 cases which comprise 30% of all settled cases were resolved bilaterally. The 
use of negotiations proves that the dispute settlement system endorses and 
incorporates the diplomatic approach rather than solely relying on the adjudicative 
processes. Although other means of "negotiation-oriented" approach such as good 
offices, conciliation, or mediation were not utilized at all, a dismissal or abandonment 
of such measures would not be beneficial for the system as a whole. Furthermore, the 
rate at which the panel reports are appealed also raises some concerns about the 
adjudicative system as a whole. The relatively high rate of reversal of the panel reports 
at the Appellate Body reaching 59% might signify that the legalistic procedures are 
not completely reliable, a fact that strengthens the argument for utilizing the 
"negotiation-oriented" methods. 
Although the system as a whole appears to be making another paradigm shift 
toward principle-oriented approach, the procedural components of the dispute 
settlement should continue to employ diplomatic and legalistic approaches in 
reaching resolutions. 
Moreover, based on the analysis of the different stages of the WTO DSS, we 
can try to draw some conclusions for possible improvements of it. 
First, the preventive power of the WTO Dispute Settlement System is too 
limited to discourage new trade restrictions. Even if the probability of winning a case 
is slim, countries have an incentive to introduce trade restrictions, as rents continue to 
accrue during the litigation process, and sanctions or compensations for past damages 
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do not exist. On the other hand, the likelihood of a nuisance suit against a well 
behaved country is rather small. A complaint is only filed if the probability of 
winning is sufficiently high. 
Second, there is a strong tendency for the losing government to appeal 
against the panel decision, even if the chances of a revision are slim. An appeal delays 
the implementation of negative findings and suits the interests of domestic groups. 
This obviously has consequences for the way the parties perceive the dispute 
settlement process, as they plan for an appeal right from the start. The appellate 
review's legal expertise might be used even by winning complainants with a view to 
accumulate arguments for future disputes on similar issues. 
Third, the implementation stage, together with the absence of sanctions for 
damages during litigation, is the weakest element of the Dispute Settlement System. 
In case of a panel/appellate review decision in favor of the complainant, the 
defendant has strong incentives to delay implementation. Unless reputation losses of 
non-conforming are sufficiently high, the limited threats of compensation payments 
or retaliation measures fail to provide the loser country's with an incentive to 
implement the panel's recommendations quickly. 
Fourth, bilateral settlements are more likely to be observed at an early stage 
of the litigation process. In clear-cut cases, the results of bilateral settlements should 
be similar to the expected ruling of the DSB. The losing party can avoid reputation 
losses (often at the price of giving up its position immediately) by agreeing upon a 
mutually accepted solution. Changes in the expected outcome of the process and in 
payoff elements, in particular by joining third parties, have an impact on the scope for 
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bilateral settlement. 
However, while changes are taking place – albeit slowly – it is unclear 
whether the reforms will change public perception of the Dispute Settlement System. 
Some of the criticisms leveled at the Dispute Settlement System are aimed at the very 
foundation of a rules based trading system and may never be adequately addressed 
through procedural reforms. If the goal is to improve the operation of the system, then 
certain changes should certainly be considered by WTO member countries. If, 
however, the goal is to gain the support – or, at least, lessen the criticisms – of the 
system's most bitter critics, then it is unclear if any amount of change will be 
sufficient. In the end, it is vital for policy makers to determine what their objectives 
really are in suggesting changes to the system. Without such a clear sense of direction, 
there is a risk that the process of reform could put at risk a system. 
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APPENDIX A 
<List of Cases 1995-2005> 
(Sources: www.wto.org - 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_ e.htm and 
www.worldtradelaw.net - http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/wtodisputes 
1.asp) 
 
Notes 
1) Only resolved cases are described in the status column. 
2) Other ways include withdrawal, amendment or expiration of the measures 
(including withdrawal of complaint) 
 
Case 
Number Case Name Brought by 
Status 
(Results) 
DS1 Malaysia – Prohibition of imports 
of polyethylene and polypropylene. Singapore Other ways 
DS2 
United States – Standards for 
reformulated and conventional 
gasoline. 
Venezuela Appellate Body 
DS3 
Korea –Measures concerning the 
testing and inspection of 
agricultural US products. 
  
DS4 
United States – Standards for 
reformulated and conventional 
gasoline. 
Brazil  
DS5 Korea – Measures concerning the 
shelf-life of products. US 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS6 
United States – Imposition of 
import duties on autos from Japan 
under Sections 301 & 304 
Japan 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS7 European Communities – Trade description of scallops. Canada 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS8 Japan – Taxes on alcoholic EC Appellate Body 
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beverages. 
DS9 European Communities – Duties on imports of cereals. Canada 
Panelists not 
selected 
DS10 Japan – Taxes on alcoholic beverages. Canada Appellate Body 
DS11 Japan – Taxes on alcoholic beverages. US Appellate Body 
DS12 European Communities – Trade description of scallops. Peru 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS13 European Communities – Duties on imports of grains. US 
Mutually 
Agreed but Not 
Notified DSB 
DS14 European Communities – Trade description of scallops. Chile 
Mutually 
Agreed but Not 
Notified DSB 
DS15 
Japan – Measures affecting the 
purchase of telecommunications 
equipment. 
EC 
Mutually 
Agreed but Not 
Notified DSB 
DS16 
European Communities – 
Importation, sale and distribution of 
bananas. 
Guatemala, 
Honduras, 
Mexico, US 
New request or 
panel 
superseded 
former matter 
DS17 European Communities – Import duties on rice. Thailand 
No further 
action after 
consultation 
DS18 Australia – Import prohibition of 
salmon from Canada. Canada 
Appellate Body 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
DS19 Poland – Import regime for 
automobiles. India 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS20 Korea – Measures concerning bottled water. Canada 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS21 Australia – Measures concerning the importation of salmonids US 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS22 Brazil – Measures affecting desiccated coconut Philippines Appellate Body 
DS23 
Venezuela – Anti-dumping 
investigation concerning certain oil 
country tubular goods. 
Mexico Other ways 
DS24 United States – Quantitative 
restrictions on Costa Rican Costa Rica Appellate Body 
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underwear. 
DS25 
European Communities – 
Implementation of Uruguay Round 
commitments concerning rice 
Uruguay 
No further 
action 
consultation 
DS26 
European Communities – Measures 
concerning meat and meat products 
(hormones). 
US 
Appellate Body 
Suspension of 
Concessions 
Arbitration 
DS27 
European Communities – Regime 
for the importation, sale and 
distribution of bananas. 
Ecuador, 
Guatemala, 
Honduras, 
Mexico, US 
Appellate Body 
Suspension of 
Concessions 
Arbitrations 
DS28 Japan – Measures concerning the protection of sound recordings US  
DS29 Turkey – Restrictions on imports of textile and clothing products. Hong Kong  
DS30 
Brazil – Measures affected 
desiccated coconut and coconut 
milk powder. 
Sri Lanka  
DS31 
Canada – Measures prohibiting or 
restricting importation of certain 
periodicals. 
US Appellate Body 
DS32 
United States – Measures affecting 
imports of women's and girls' wool 
coats. 
India Other ways 
DS33 
United States – Measures affecting 
imports of woven wool shirts and 
blouses. 
India Appellate Body 
DS34 Turkey – Restrictions on imports of textile and clothing products India Appellate Body 
DS35 Hungary – Export subsidies in 
respect of agricultural products. 
Argentina, 
Canada, 
Australia, New 
Zealand, 
Thailand, US 
 
DS36 
Pakistan – Patent protection for 
pharmaceutical and agricultural 
chemical products. 
US  
DS37 Portugal – Patent protection under the Industrial Property Act. US  
DS38 United States – The Cuban Liberty 
and Democratic Solidarity Act. EC Panel's lapsed 
DS39 United States – Tariff increases on products from the EC EC Other ways 
DS40 Korea – Laws, regulations and practices in the telecommunications EC  
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procurement sector. 
DS41 Korea – Measures concerning inspection of agricultural products. US  
DS42 Japan – Measures concerning sound 
recordings. EC  
DS43 Turkey – Taxation of foreign film 
revenues. 
US  
DS44 
Japan – Measures affecting 
consumer photographic film & 
paper. 
US 
Panel report 
adopted 
without appeal 
DS45 Japan – Measures affecting distribution services. US  
DS46 Brazil – Export financing program for aircraft. Canada 
Appellate Body 
Suspension of 
Concessions 
Arbitration 
DS47 Turkey – Restrictions on imports of textile and clothing products. Thailand  
DS48 
European Communities – Measures 
affecting meat and meat products 
(hormones). 
Canada 
Appellate Body 
Suspension of 
Concessions 
Arbitration 
DS49 
United States – Anti-dumping 
investigation on fresh and chilled 
tomatoes from Mexico. 
Mexico 
Mutually 
Agreed but Not 
Notified DSB 
DS50 
India – Patent protection for 
pharmaceutical and agricultural 
chemical products. 
US Appellate Body 
DS51 Brazil – Certain automotive investment measures. Japan  
DS52 
Brazil – Certain measures affecting 
trade and investment in the 
automotive sector. 
US  
DS53 Mexico – Customs valuation of imports. EC  
DS54 Indonesia – Certain measures 
affecting the automobile industry. EC 
Panel report 
adopted 
without appeal 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
DS55 Indonesia – Certain measures 
affecting the automobile industry. Japan  
DS56 
Argentina – Measures affecting 
imports of footwear, textiles, 
apparel and other items. 
US Appellate Body 
 72 
DS57 
Australia – Textile, Clothing and 
Footwear Import Credit Scheme 
(TCP Scheme). 
US 
Mutually 
Agreed but 
Notified DSB 
DS58 United States – Import prohibition 
of shrimp and shrimp products. 
India, 
Malaysia, 
Pakistan, 
Thailand 
 
DS59 Indonesia – Certain measures 
affecting the automobile industry. US 
Panel report 
adopted 
without appeal 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
DS60 
Guatemala – Anti-dumping 
investigation on imports of Portland 
cement from Mexico. 
Mexico Appellate Body 
DS61 
United States – Import prohibition 
of certain shrimp and shrimp 
products 
Philippines Appellate Body 
DS62 
European Communities – Customs 
classification of certain computer 
equipment 
US  
DS63 United States – Anti-dumping 
measures on imports of solid urea EC  
DS64 Indonesia – Certain automotive industry measures Japan 
Panel report 
adopted 
without appeal 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
DS65 
Brazil – Certain measures affecting 
trade and investment in the 
automotive sector 
US  
DS66 Japan – Measures affecting imports 
of pork EC  
DS67 
United Kingdom – Customs 
classification of certain computer 
equipment 
US Appellate Body 
DS68 Ireland – Customs classification of 
certain computer equipment US Appellate Body 
DS69 
European Communities – Measures 
affecting importation of certain 
poultry products 
Brazil Appellate Body 
DS70 & 
DS71 
Canada – Measures affecting the 
export of civilian aircraft Brazil Appellate Body 
DS72 European Communities – Measures New Zealand Panel Ruling 
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affecting butter products 
DS73 Japan – Procurement of a 
navigational satellite EC  
DS74 Philippines – Measures affecting pork and poultry US  
DS75 Korea – Taxes on alcoholic beverages EC 
Appellate Body 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
DS76 Japan – Measures affecting 
agricultural products US Appellate Body 
DS77 Argentina – Measures affecting textiles, clothing and footwear EC 
Panel's 
authority 
lapsed 
DS78 
United States – Safeguard measure 
against imports of broom and corn 
brooms 
Colombia  
DS79 
India – Patent protection for 
pharmaceutical & agricultural 
chemical products 
EC 
Panel report 
adopted 
without appeal 
DS80 
Belgium – Measures affecting 
commercial telephone directory 
services 
US  
DS81 
Brazil – Measures affecting trade 
and investment in the automotive 
sector 
EC  
DS82 
Ireland – Measures affecting the 
grant of copyright and neighboring 
rights 
US  
DS83 
Denmark – Measures affecting the 
enforcement of intellectual property 
rights 
US  
DS84 Korea – Taxes on alcoholic beverages US 
Appellate Body 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
DS85 United States – Measures affecting textiles and apparel products EC 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS86 
Sweden – Measures affecting the 
enforcement of intellectual property 
rights 
US 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS87 Chile – Taxes on alcoholic beverages EC 
Appellate Body 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
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DS88 United States – Measures affecting government procurement EC 
Panel's 
authority 
lapsed 
DS89 
United States – Imposition of 
anti-dumping duties on imports of 
color television receivers from 
Korea 
Korea Other ways 
DS90 
India – Quantitative restrictions on 
imports of agricultural, textile and 
industrial products 
US Appellate Body 
DS91 
India – Quantitative restrictions on 
imports of agricultural, textile and 
industrial products 
Australia 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS92 
India – Quantitative restrictions on 
imports of agricultural, textile and 
industrial products 
Canada 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS93 
India – Quantitative restrictions on 
imports of agricultural, textile and 
industrial products 
New Zealand 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS94 
India – Quantitative restrictions on 
imports of agricultural, textile and 
industrial products. 
Switzerland 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS95 United States – Measures affecting government procurement. Japan 
Panel's 
authority 
lapsed 
DS96 
India – Quantitative restrictions on 
imports of agricultural, textile and 
industrial products. 
EC 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS97 
United States – Countervailing duty 
investigation of imports of salmon 
from Chile. 
Chile  
DS98 
Korea – Definitive safeguard 
measure on imports of certain dairy 
products. 
EC Appellate Body 
DS99 
United States – Anti-dumping duty 
on dynamic random access memory 
semiconductors (DRAMS) of one 
megabyte or above originating from 
Korea. 
Korea 
Panel report 
adopted 
without appeal 
DS100 United States – Measures affecting imports of poultry products. EC  
DS101 
Mexico – Anti-dumping 
investigation of high-fructose corn 
syrup from the United States 
US  
DS102 Philippines – Measures affecting pork and poultry US 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
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Notified DSB 
DS103 
Canada – Measures affecting the 
importation of milk & the 
exportation of dairy products 
US Appellate Body 
DS104 
European Communities – Measures 
affecting the exportation of 
processed cheese 
US  
DS105 
European Communities – Regime 
for the importation, sale and 
distribution of bananas 
Panama  
DS106 
Australia – Subsidies provided to 
producers and exporters of 
automotive leather 
US 
New request or 
panel 
superseded 
former matter 
DS107 Pakistan – Export measures 
affecting hides and skins EC  
DS108 United States – Tax treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations EC Appellate Body 
DS109 Chile – Taxes on alcoholic beverages US  
DS110 Chile – Taxes on alcoholic beverages EC Appellate Body 
DS111 United States – Tariff rate quota for imports of groundnuts Argentina  
DS112 
Peru – Countervailing duty 
investigation against imports of 
buses from Brazil 
Brazil  
DS113 Canada – Measures affecting dairy 
exports New Zealand Appellate Body 
DS114 Canada- Patent protection for pharmaceutical products EC 
Panel report 
adopted 
without appeal 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
DS115 
European Communities – Measures 
affecting the grant of copyright and 
neighboring rights 
US  
DS116 Brazil – Measures affecting payment terms for imports EC  
DS117 Canada – Measures affecting film distribution services EC  
DS118 United States – Harbor maintenance tax EC  
DS119 Australia – Anti-dumping measures 
on imports of coated wood free Switzerland 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
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paper sheets Notified DSB 
DS120 India – Measures affecting export 
of certain commodities EC  
DS121 Argentina – Safeguard measures on imports of footwear EC Appellate Body 
DS122 
Thailand – Anti-dumping duties on 
angles, shapes & sections of iron or 
non-alloy steel & H-beams 
Poland Appellate Body 
DS123 Argentina – Safeguard measures on imports of footwear Indonesia Other ways 
DS124 & 
DS125 
European Communities – 
Enforcement of intellectual 
property rights for motion pictures 
and TV programs. Greece – 
Enforcement of intellectual 
property rights for motion pictures 
and TV programs. 
US 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS126 
Australia – Subsidies provided to 
producers and exporters of 
automotive leather 
US 
Panel report 
adopted 
without appeal 
DS127 Belgium – Measure affecting tax treatment for exports US  
DS128 Netherlands – Measure affecting tax treatment for exports US  
DS129 Greece – Measure affecting tax treatment for exports US  
DS130 Ireland – Measure affecting tax treatment for exports US  
DS131 France – Measures affecting tax treatment for imports and exports US  
DS132 
Mexico – Anti-dumping 
investigation of high-fructose corn 
syrup from the United States 
US Appellate Body 
DS133 
Slovak Republic – Measures 
concerning the importation of dairy 
products & the transit of cattle 
Switzerland  
DS134 European Communities – Measures 
affecting import duties on rice India  
DS135 
European Communities – Measures 
affecting asbestos and products 
containing asbestos 
Canada Appellate Body 
DS136 United States – Anti-Dumping Act 
of 1916 EC 
Appellate Body 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
DS137 European Communities – Measures Canada  
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affecting imports of wood of 
conifers from Canada 
DS138 
United States – Imposition of 
countervailing duties on certain 
hot-rolled lead & bismuth carbon 
steel products originating from the 
United Kingdom 
EC Appellate Body 
DS139 Canada – Certain measures 
affecting the automotive industry Japan 
Appellate Body 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
DS140 
European Communities – 
Anti-dumping measures on imports 
of unbleached cotton fabrics from 
India 
India  
DS141 
European Communities – 
Anti-dumping measures on imports 
of cotton-type bed-linen from India 
India Appellate Body 
DS142 Canada – Certain measures 
affecting the automotive industry EC 
Appellate Body 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
DS143 
Slovak Republic – Measure 
affecting import duty on wheat 
from Hungary 
Hungary  
DS144 
United States – Certain measures 
affecting the import of cattle, swine 
and grain from Canada 
Canada  
DS145 
Argentina – Countervailing duties 
on imports of wheat gluten from the 
European Communities 
EC  
DS146 India – Measures affecting the 
automotive sector EC Appellate Body 
DS147 Japan – Tariff quotas and subsidies 
affecting leather EC  
DS148 
Czech Republic – Measure 
affecting import duty on wheat 
from Hungary 
Hungary  
DS149 India – Import Restrictions EC  
DS150 India – Measures affecting customs duties EC  
DS151 United States – Measures affecting textiles and apparel products (II) EC 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS152 United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 EC 
Panel report 
adopted 
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without appeal 
DS153 
European Communities – Patent 
protection for pharmaceutical and 
agricultural products 
Canada  
DS154 
European Communities – Measures 
affecting differential and favorable 
treatment of coffee 
Brazil  
DS155 
Argentina – Measures on the export 
of bovine hides and the import of 
finished leather 
EC 
Panel report 
adopted 
without appeal 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
DS156 
Guatemala – Definitive 
anti-dumping measure regarding 
grey Portland cement from Mexico 
Mexico 
Panel report 
adopted 
without appeal 
DS157 
Argentina – Anti-dumping 
measures on imports of drill bits 
from Italy 
EC  
DS158 
European Communities – Regime 
for the importation, sale and 
distribution of bananas (II) 
Guatemala 
Honduras, 
Mexico, 
Panama. US 
 
DS159 Hungary – Safeguard measure on imports of steel products 
Czech 
Republic  
DS160 United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act EC 
Voluntary 
arbitration, but 
invoked after 
the reasonable 
period of time 
for 
implementation 
expired Panel 
report adopted 
without appeal 
DS161 Korea – Measures affecting imports 
of fresh, chilled and frozen beef US Appellate Body 
DS162 United States – Anti-Dumping Act 
of 1916 (II) Japan 
Appellate Body 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
DS163 Korea – Measures affecting government procurement US 
Panel report 
adopted 
without appeal 
DS164 Argentina – Measures affecting imports of footwear US  
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DS165 
United States – Import measures on 
certain products from the European 
Communities 
EC Appellate Body 
DS166 
United States – Definitive 
safeguard measures on imports of 
wheat gluten 
EC Appellate Body 
DS167 
United States – Countervailing duty 
investigation with respect to live 
cattle from Canada 
Canada  
DS168 
South Africa – Anti-dumping duties 
on import of certain pharmaceutical 
products from India 
India  
DS169 Korea – Measures affecting imports 
of fresh, chilled and frozen beef Australia Appellate Body 
DS170 Canada – Term of protection for patents US 
Appellate Body 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
DS171 Argentina – Patent protection for pharmaceutical products US  
DS172 
European Communities – Measures 
relating to the development of a 
flight management system 
US  
DS173 
France – Measures relating to the 
development of a flight 
management system 
US  
DS174 
European Communities – Measures 
relating to the protection of 
trademarks & geographical 
indications 
US  
DS175 
India – Measures relating to trade & 
investment in the motor vehicle 
sector 
US Appellate Body 
DS176 United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act EC Appellate Body 
DS177 
United States – Safeguard measure 
on imports of fresh, chilled or 
frozen lamb from New Zealand 
New Zealand Appellate Body 
DS178 
United States – Safeguard measure 
on imports of fresh, chilled or 
frozen lamb from Australia 
Australia Appellate Body 
DS179 
United States – Anti-dumping 
measures on stainless steel plate in 
coils and stainless steel sheet and 
strip from Korea 
Korea 
Panel report 
adopted 
without appeal 
DS180 United States – Reclassification of Canada  
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certain sugar syrups 
DS181 
Colombia – Safeguard measure on 
imports of plain polyester filaments 
from Thailand 
Thailand Other ways 
DS182 
Ecuador – Provisional 
anti-dumping measure on cement 
from Mexico 
Mexico  
DS183 
Brazil – Measures on import 
licensing and minimum import 
prices 
EC  
DS184 
United States – Anti-dumping 
measures on certain hot-rolled steel 
products from Japan 
Japan 
Appellate Body 
Reasonable 
Period of Time 
Arbitration 
DS185 Trinidad & Tobago – Anti-dumping 
measures on pasta from Costa Rica Costa Rica  
DS186 
United States – Section 337 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930 & amendments 
thereto 
EC  
DS187 
Trinidad & Tobago – Provisional 
anti-dumping measure on imports 
of macaroni & spaghetti from Costa 
Rica 
Costa Rica  
DS188 
Nicaragua – Measures affecting 
imports from Honduras & 
Colombia 
Colombia  
DS189 
Argentina – Definitive 
anti-dumping measures on 
carton-board imports from 
Germany & definitive anti-dumping 
measures on imports of ceramic 
floor tiles from Italy 
EC 
Panel report 
adopted 
without appeal 
DS190 
Argentina – Transitional safeguard 
measures on certain imports of 
woven fabrics of cotton and cotton 
mixtures originating in Brazil 
Brazil 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS191 Ecuador – Definitive anti-dumping 
measure on cement from Mexico Mexico 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS192 
United States – Transitional 
safeguard measure on combed 
cotton yarn from Pakistan 
Pakistan Appellate Body 
DS193 Chile – Measures affecting transit 
and importation of swordfish EC  
DS194 United States – Section 771(5) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended Canada 
Panel report  
adopted 
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and applied without appeal 
DS195 
Philippines – Measures affecting 
trade and investment in the motor 
vehicle sector 
US  
DS196 
Argentina – Certain measures on 
the protection of patents and test 
data 
US  
DS197 Brazil – Measures on minimum import prices US  
DS198 Romania – Measures on minimum import prices US 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS199 Brazil – Measures affecting patent protection US  
DS200 
United States – Section 306 of the 
Trade Act of 1974 and amendments 
thereto 
EC  
DS201 
Nicaragua – Measures affecting 
imports from Honduras & 
Colombia 
Honduras  
DS202 
United States – Definitive 
safeguard measures on imports of 
circular welded carbon quality pipe 
from Korea 
Korea Appellate Body 
DS203 Mexico – Measures affecting trade in live swine US  
DS204 Mexico – Measures affecting telecommunications services US  
DS205 Egypt – Import Prohibition on 
canned tuna with soybean oil Thailand  
DS206 
United States – Anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures on steel 
plate from India 
India Appellate Body 
DS207 
Chile – Price band system and 
safeguard measures relating to 
certain agricultural products 
Argentina Panel ruling 
DS208 Turkey – Anti-dumping duty on 
steel and iron pipe fittings Brazil  
DS209 European Communities – Measures 
affecting soluble coffee Brazil  
DS210 
Belgium – Administration of 
measures establishing customs 
duties for rice 
US 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS211 Egypt – Definitive anti-dumping 
measures on rebar from Turkey Turkey  
DS212 United States – Countervailing EC  
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measures concerning certain 
products from the EC 
DS213 
United States – Countervailing 
duties on certain corrosion-resistant 
carbon steel flat products from 
Germany 
EC Appellate Body 
DS214 
United States – Definitive 
safeguard measures on imports of 
steel wire rod and circular welded 
carbon quality line pipe 
EC  
DS215 
Philippines – Anti-dumping 
measures regarding polypropylene 
resins from Korea 
Korea  
DS216 Mexico – Provisional anti-dumping 
measure on electric transformers Brazil  
DS217 
United States – Continued 
Dumping & Subsidy Offset Act of 
2000 
Australia, 
Brazil, Chile, 
the EC, India, 
Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, 
Thailand 
Panel ruling 
DS218 
United States – Countervailing 
duties on certain carbon steel 
products from Brazil 
Brazil  
DS219 
European Communities – 
Anti-dumping duties on malleable 
cast iron tube or pipe fittings from 
Brazil 
Brazil  
DS220 
Chile – Price band system and 
safeguard measures relating to 
certain agricultural products 
Guatemala  
DS221 
United States – Section 129(c)(l) of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act 
Canada  
DS222 Canada – Export credits & loan guarantees for regional aircraft Brazil Panel ruling 
DS223 
European Communities – 
Tariff-rate quota on corn gluten 
feed from the US 
US  
DS224 United States – US Patents Code Brazil  
DS225 United States – Anti-dumping duties on seamless pipe from Italy EC  
DS226 Chile – Provisional safeguard 
measure on mixed edible oils Argentina  
DS227 Pent – Taxes on cigarettes Chile Other ways 
DS228 Chile – Safeguard Measures on Colombia New request or 
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Sugar panel 
superseded 
former matter 
DS229 Brazil – Anti-Dumping Duties on Jute Bags from India India  
DS230 
Chile – Safeguard Measures and 
Modification of Schedules 
Regarding Sugar 
Colombia  
DS231 European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines Peru Panel ruling 
DS232 Mexico – Measures Affecting the Import of Matches Chile  
DS233 Argentina – Measures Affecting the Import of Pharmaceutical Products India  
DS234 
United States – Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 
2000 
Mexico Panel ruling 
DS235 Slovakia – Safeguard Measure on Imports of Sugar Poland  
DS236 
United States – Preliminary 
Determinations with Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from 
Canada 
Canada  
DS237 Turkey – Certain Import Procedures for Fresh Fruit Ecuador  
DS238 
Argentina – Definitive Safeguard 
Measures on Imports of Preserved 
Peaches 
Chile  
DS239 
United States – Certain Measures 
Regarding Anti-Dumping 
Methodology 
Brazil  
DS240 Romania – Import Prohibition on Wheat and Wheat Flour Hungary  
DS241 
Argentina – Definitive 
Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry 
from Brazil 
Brazil  
DS242 European Communities – Generalized System of Preferences Thailand  
DS243 United States — Rules of origin for textiles and apparel products India  
DS244 
United States — Sunset review of 
anti-dumping duties on 
corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat 
products from Japan 
Japan Appellate Body 
DS245 Japan — Measures affecting the importation of apples US 
Information on 
implementation 
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DS246 
European Communities — 
Conditions for the granting of tariff 
preferences to developing countries 
India Appellate Body 
DS247 
United States — Provisional 
anti-dumping measure on imports 
of certain softwood lumber from 
Canada 
Canada  
DS248 
United States — Definitive 
safeguard measures on imports of 
certain steel products 
EC  
DS249 
United States — Definitive 
safeguard measures on imports of 
certain steel products 
Japan  
DS250 
United States — Equalizing excise 
tax imposed by Florida on 
processed orange and grapefruit 
Products 
Brazil  
DS251 
United States — Definitive 
safeguard measures on imports of 
certain steel products 
Korea  
DS252 
United States — Definitive 
safeguard measures on imports of 
certain steel products 
China  
DS253 
United States — Definitive 
safeguard measures on imports of 
certain steel products 
Switzerland  
DS254 
United States — Definitive 
safeguard measures on imports of 
certain steel products 
Norway  
DS255 Peru — Tax treatment on certain imported products Chile  
DS256 Turkey — Import ban on pet food from Hungary Hungary  
DS257 
United States — Final 
countervailing duty determination 
with respect to certain softwood 
lumber from Canada 
Canada Appellate Body 
DS258 
United States — Definitive 
safeguard measures on imports of 
certain steel products 
New Zealand  
DS259 
United States — Definitive 
safeguard measures on imports of 
certain steel products 
Brazil  
DS260 
European Communities — 
Provisional safeguard measures on 
imports of certain steel products 
United States  
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DS261 Uruguay — Tax treatment on 
certain products Chile 
Mutually 
Agreed and 
Notified DSB 
DS262 
United States — Sunset reviews of 
anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties on certain steel Products 
from France and Germany 
EC  
DS263 European Communities — Measures affecting imports of wine Argentina  
DS264 
United States — Final dumping 
determination on softwood lumber 
from Canada 
Canada  
DS265 European Communities — Export 
subsidies on sugar Australia 
Constitution of 
the Panel 
DS266 European Communities — Export 
subsidies on sugar Brazil 
Constitution of 
the Panel 
DS267 United States — Subsidies on 
upland Cotton Brazil  
DS268 
United States — Sunset review of 
anti-dumping measures on oil 
country tubular goods from 
Argentina 
Argentina  
DS269 
European Communities — Customs 
classification of frozen boneless 
chicken 
Brazil  
DS270 
Australia — Certain measures 
affecting the importation of fresh 
fruit and vegetables 
Philippines  
DS271 
Australia — Certain measures 
affecting the importation of fresh 
pineapple 
Philippines  
DS272 
Peru — Provisional anti-dumping 
duties on vegetable oils from 
Argentina 
Argentina  
DS273 Korea — Measures affecting trade in commercial vessels EC  
DS274 
United States — Definitive 
safeguard measures on imports of 
certain steel products 
Chinese Taipei  
DS275 
Venezuela — Import licensing 
measures on certain agricultural 
products 
United States  
DS276 
Canada — Measures relating to 
exports of wheat and treatment of 
imported grain 
United States  
DS277 United States — Investigation of Canada  
 86 
the International Trade Commission 
in softwood lumber from Canada 
DS278 Chile — Definitive safeguard 
measure on imports of fructose Argentina  
DS279 
India — Import restrictions 
maintained under the export and 
import policy, 2002-2007 
EC  
DS280 United States — Countervailing duties on steel plate from Mexico Mexico  
DS281 United States — Anti-dumping 
measures on cement from Mexico Mexico  
DS282 
United States — Anti-dumping 
measures on oil country tubular 
goods (OCTG) from Mexico 
Mexico  
DS283 European Communities — Export 
subsidies on sugar Thailand 
Constitution of 
the Panel 
DS284 
Mexico — Certain measures 
preventing the importation of black 
beans from Nicaragua 
Nicaragua  
DS285 
United States — Measures affecting 
the cross-border supply of gambling 
and betting services 
Antigua and 
Barbuda  
DS286 
European Communities — Customs 
classification of frozen boneless 
chicken cuts 
Thailand  
DS287 Australia — Quarantine regime for imports EC  
DS288 
South Africa — Definitive 
anti-dumping measures on 
blanketing from Turkey 
Turkey  
DS289 Czech Republic — Additional duty 
on imports of pig-meat from Poland Poland  
DS290 
European Communities — 
Protection of trademarks & 
geographical indications for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs 
Australia  
DS291 
European Communities — 
Measures affecting the approval 
and marketing of biotech products 
United States  
DS292 
European Communities — 
Measures affecting the approval 
and marketing of biotech products 
Canada  
DS293 
European Communities — 
Measures affecting the approval 
and marketing of biotech products 
Argentina  
DS294 United States — Laws, Regulations EC  
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and Methodology for Calculating 
Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”) 
DS295 Mexico — Definitive anti dumping 
measures on beef and rice United States  
DS296 
United States — Countervailing 
duty investigation on dynamic 
random access memory 
semiconductors (DRAMS) from 
Korea 
Korea Establishment 
of a panel 
DS297 
Croatia — Measure affecting 
imports of live animals and meat 
products 
Hungary  
DS298 
Mexico — Certain pricing 
measures for customs valuation and 
other purposes 
Guatemala  
DS299 
European Communities — 
Countervailing measures on 
dynamic random access memory 
chips from Korea 
Korea Establishment 
of a panel 
DS300 
Dominican Republic — Measures 
affecting the importation of 
cigarettes 
Honduras  
DS301 
European Communities — 
Measures affecting trade in 
commercial vessels 
Korea  
DS302 
Dominican Republic — Measures 
affecting the importation and 
internal sale of cigarettes 
Honduras Establishment 
of a panel 
DS303 
Ecuador — Definitive safeguard 
measure on imports of medium 
density fibreboard 
Chile  
DS304 
India — Anti-dumping measures on 
imports of certain products from the 
European Communities and/or 
Member States 
EC 
Request to join 
consultations 
Acceptance of 
requests to join 
consultations 
DS305 
Egypt — Measures affecting 
imports of textile and apparel 
products 
United States 
Request to join 
consultations 
Acceptance of 
requests to join 
consultations 
DS306 India — Anti-dumping measure on batteries from Bangladesh Bangladesh 
Request for 
consultations 
DS307 European Communities — Aid for 
commercial vessels Korea  
DS308 Mexico — Tax measures on soft United States  
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drinks and other beverages 
DS309 China — Value-added tax on integrated circuits United States  
DS310 
United States — Determination of 
the International Trade Commission 
in hard red spring wheat from 
Canada 
Canada  
DS311 
United States — Reviews of 
countervailing duty on softwood 
lumber from Canada 
Canada  
DS312 
Korea — Anti-dumping duties on 
imports of certain paper from 
Indonesia 
Indonesia  
DS313 
European Communities — 
Anti-dumping duties on certain flat 
rolled iron or non-alloy steel 
products from India 
India  
DS314 
Mexico — Provisional 
Countervailing Measures on Olive 
oil from the European Communities 
EC  
DS315 European Communities — Selected 
customs matters United States  
DS316 
European Communities and certain 
Member States — Measures 
affecting trade in large civil aircraft 
United States  
DS317 United States — Measures affecting trade in large civil aircraft EC  
DS318 
India — Anti-dumping measures on 
certain products from the Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu 
The Separate 
Customs 
Territory of 
Taiwan, 
Penghu, 
Kinmen and 
Matsu 
 
DS319 United States — Section 776 of the Tariff Act of 1930 EC  
DS320 
United States — Continued 
suspension of obligations in the EC 
— Hormones dispute 
EC  
DS321 
Canada — Continued suspension of 
obligations in the EC — Hormones 
dispute 
EC  
DS323 Japan — Import quotas on dried laver and seasoned laver Korea  
DS322 United States — Measures relating to zeroing and sunset reviews Japan  
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DS324 
United States — Provisional 
anti-dumping measures on shrimp 
from Thailand 
Thailand  
DS325 
United States — Anti-dumping 
determinations regarding stainless 
steel from Mexico 
Mexico  
DS326 
European Communities — 
Definitive safeguard measure on 
salmon 
Chile  
DS327 Egypt — Anti-dumping duties on 
matches from Pakistan Pakistan  
DS328 
European Communities — 
Definitive Safeguard Measure on 
Salmon 
Norway  
DS329 Panama — Tariff classification of 
certain milk products Mexico  
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